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I. INTRODUCTION
Whereas the past few years have witnessed an increasingly
intense debate over the rationales for the conventional-
arms supply policies of the United States and other
countries, curiously short shrift has been given to
traditional geopolitical rationales for arms sales, that
is, to the use of arms transfers as a major instrument in
the global competition for acguiring and maintaining
strategic military access and conversely, for diminishing
or denying the access of others. These rationales are
often cited almost as an afterthought at the end of long
lists of reasons for arms transfers. The omission is
particularly surprising because such rationales are being
relied upon with increasing freguency, if guietly, within
the United States government. (Harkavy, p. 131)
This thesis elaborates on this perception by a comparison
of the formal Congressional Notifications (36b Notification)
for an arms transfer with the standard written and publicized
policies of the Carter and Reagan Administrations. Although
these notifications do not necessarily constitute an arms sale
or transfer, they do reflect an attitude from the executive
branch to the legislative branch and the public sector
encouraging support for a particular middle eastern country.
In other words they are the basis for the geopolitical
rationale in forming a middle eastern foreign policy within a
Presidential Administration.
In order to produce a comprehensive model for comparison,
a database of over 700 records of 36b Congressional
Notifications has been compiled. The notifications are from
daily Senate Proceedings and an unclassified listing from the
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) . There is no known
database of 36b Notifications available except for my
research. This unclassified information provides a means of
evaluating an Administration's proposed arms sale or transfer.
This thesis uses the compiled figures of the formal 36b
Congressional Notifications database from fiscal year 1977
through fiscal year 1988.
A. HYPOTHESES
Research was based on the following four hypotheses:
1) The Democratic Administration (fiscal years 1977-1980)
under President Carter obtained a reduction in United
States proposed arms transfers to the Persian Gulf under
the Arms Transfer Policy Directive of May 19, 1977.
2) The Republican Administrations (fiscal years 1981-1988)
under President Reagan promoted an increase in United
States proposed arms transfers in the Persian under the
Arms Transfer Policy Directive of July 8, 1981.
3) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are a major influence in
developing United States foreign policy in the Persian
Gulf and was the primary instrument used to gain
strategic access.
4) Foreign Military Sales will play a major role in
defining United States economic and financial issues in
the future.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to use the
Congressional 36b notifications from fiscal years 1977 to 1988
to test these propositions.
B. THE FOCUSSED COMPARISON APPROACH
This study is not intended to be strictly a statistical
analysis of foreign arms sales and transfers to the Middle
East, but will use the focussed comparison approach.
The focussed comparison approach was chosen over other
methodological approaches because it supports a rational
theory development that combines the lessons of history,
political science, and elementary statistical analysis.
Historians teach us that the lessons of the past are often
inconsistent. To base an answer using these generalizations
is hazardous if not carefully gualified. Political scien-
tists, on the other hand, seek to develop a single comprehen-
sive analytical framework to explain these behavioral incon-
sistencies of the past. By combining historical outcomes with
a scientific analytical framework and correlating the results
of the study, the inconsistencies can be clarified (George,
p. 44) . This method will not give an absolute answer. Yet it
does identify some additional critical conditions and vari-
ables that caused the inconsistencies so that the rationale
for the decisions made can be explained in a more logical
manner.
This thesis examines six countries in the Persian Gulf as
individual case studies: Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran.
These countries were selected for three reasons. First,
most of them are among the top contenders of proposed arms
sales and transfers during the Carter and Reagan Administra-
tions. Second, their geographic position make-up one of the
"five keys that lock up the world" (Till, p. 83). Finally,
they are and will continue to be the crux of controversy when
attempting to formulate a viable foreign policy within the
United States government.
This method uses a standardized set of questions of each
case. A systemic analysis of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 have ten
questions asked of each case. The first six questions deal
with the 36b notification of proposed arms transfers (the
independent variable) , and the remainder are about strategic
access that resulted from arms sale (the dependent variable)
.
Conclusions drawn from this will be in Chapter VI.
For hypothesis 4, two questions are asked and will be an-
swered in Chapter V. The first question deals with future
arms sales and transfers (the independent variable) . The
second question is answered by applying the data to a model to
test the impact of restraint in foreign military sales on the
United States economy (the dependent variable) . Conclusions
to these questions are summarized in Chapter VI.
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: ARMS TRANSFER
1) Is the United States the sole or predominant supplier of
military arms?
2) What was the total dollar amount of the 36b Congres-
sional Notifications during the Carter and Reagan Ad-
ministrations?
3) Did the dollar amount of the 36b Congressional Notifica-
tions increase or decrease during the Carter and Reagan
Administrations?
4) What are the anticipated payment terms?
5) What was the quantity of the proposed arms transfer?
6) What was the quality of the proposed arms transfer?
D. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRATEGIC ACCESS
7) Is the recipient a major United States or Western oil
supplier?
8) How strategically important is the recipient's geo-
graphic location?
9) Were there any significant events affecting the value of
access?
10) Who is the major supplier to adjacent adversaries?
E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND THEIR
ECONOMIC IMPACT
11) Are foreign military arms sales and transfers important
to the United States economy?
F. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES PROGRAM
12) What is the economic impact of restraint on prospective
military sales to the Persian Gulf?
G. CONCEPT DEFINITION
The following defines the variables used in the above in-
dependent and dependent variable questions.
1. Ql
A sole supplier of arms provides 100 percent of the
recipient's military equipment. A predominant supplier
provides over 50 percent (Mihalka, pp. 49-76)
.
2. Q2
Section 36b of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976
requires the Administration to notify Congress 30 days before
issuing a letter of offer to sell military arms or other
related services to a foreign country or international
organization. Each 36b Notification represents a single
proposed arms sale or transfer to an individual country that
exceeds the following legislated dollar threshold:
1) An offer to sell defense equipment and services for $50
million or more,
2) An offer to sell design and construction services for
$200 million or more, or
3) An offer to sell major defense equipment for $14 million
or more.
Major defense equipment is defined as any item of significant
combat equipment on the United States Munitions List having a
nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50
million or a total production cost of more than $200 million
(United States FMS procedures, pp. 17-31)
.
Each 36b Notification lists the proposed recipient,
the total dollar amount of the equipment of service, a
specific list of the military materials, and a justification
for the sale. These records have been compiled for fiscal
years 1977 through 1988 so dollar amounts for each proposed
arms sale or transfer can be totaled.
3. £3
Since the data from the 36b Notifications has been
compiled into individual fiscal years a comparison can be made
of increases or decreases for each administration.
4. 21
There are four primary types of payment terms: Mili-
tary Assistance Program (a grant) , direct loans repayable in
United States currency within a specified time period, a
government credit guaranty loan for an extended period of
time, or cash.
5. £5
The quantity of proposed arms sales or transfers are
coded as follows:
below $50 million negligible
$50-$500 million small
$500-$l billion moderate
more than $1 billion high (Brayton, p. 80)
This scale is an accepted means of measuring the quantity of
arms delivered (not to include commitments) , and will suffice
when appraising proposed arms sales and transfers from the
United States. Since 1976 Congress has not turned down an
administration's request for an arms sale or transfer to a
middle eastern country. Therefore data on a proposed arms
sale or transfer is an excellent indicator of the quantity of
equipment that may be or has already been agreed upon for sale
or transfer.
6. £6
The quality of a proposed arms sale or transfer was
assessed in two contexts: absolute and regional. In ab-
solute, or worldwide, terms, the quality of arms was con-
sidered low if the military equipment was old, unsophisticated
or could be purchased from a number of different suppliers in
the military arms market. For example, equipment from the
1950-1960 vintage such as the Patton Tank or various small
arms would fall into this category. If equipment is from the
1960-1970s, it is considered moderate (or average) . Equipment
of this nature would be the F-5 or the F-15 Fighter aircraft
and early models of the AIM-7 Sparrow or AIM-9 Sidewinder air-
to air-missiles. The qualifier for high quality military
equipment would be if the United States uses the same equip-
ment in its own munitions inventory. The F-16, F/A-18
Fighter/Attack aircraft, Harpoon Missiles and Stinger Missiles
would qualify as a high quality weapons.
The second qualifier for equipment quality, regional,
is subjective. For example, before the United States will
propose a sale involving conformal wing fuel tanks for the F-
15 and F-16 Fighter aircraft an agreement must be reached that
spells out the requirements for and the restriction placed
upon their use. Nevertheless, these tanks extend the aircraft
range capability and therefore increases the weapons capabili-
ty and threat as well. Since the middle east countries around
the Persian Gulf, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, are
relatively small, this factor could change the entire defense
structure of one country against a perceived opponent.
7. £7
The quantity of crude oil supplied was coded as fol-
lows:




The world's largest reserves of crude oil are located in the
countries that form the perimeter of the Persian Gulf. Since
it is financially easy to recover, it remains the cheapest
source of crude oil in the world. Industrialized nations of
the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have grown depen-
dent on a steady flow of crude oil to keep their manufacturing
complexes running. Strategic access to this area is vital to
keep the oil flowing to the West.
8. Q8
The host/recipient nations' s geographic location was
the primary factor in determining geostrategic importance.
Emphasis was placed on the presence or absence of strategic
mineral resources in Q7 . Geostrategic importance was coded as
high if a country was located in an area important to Soviet
national interests, was adjacent to primary soviet naval
operating areas, and commanded naval chokepoints. (Turnbull,
p. 13)
9. £9
Cases of significant events which would temporarily or
permanently increase the value of access include wars or con-
flicts in which United States access is used to help provide
support to a recipient from a arms sale or transfer.
10. 010
Competition within the arms industry has increased
because of the presence of more suppliers and fewer buyers.
The supplier has to attain the highest level of technology
possible to entice a recipient to buy their military equip-
ment. All middle eastern countries are aware of the availa-
bility of military eguipment and how to approach the economi-
cally motivated supplier to buy the equipment. For example
the United States is acutely aware of the presence capability
of Soviet made military equipment and strives to counter that
capability without compromising their current technology and
expertise. It is important to pair these capabilities and
with proposed arms sales and transfers during each Administra-
tion.
11. Oil
Foreign military arms sales and the economy of the
United States is examined from three viewpoints. First the
study conducted in 1976 by the Office of Management and Budget
on how United States industry would be affected by a substan-
tial reduction in arms sales. Second, a working paper by the
Regional Conflict Working Group entitled "Commitment to
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Freedom" that examines future arms sales as an integrated
long-term strategy for the third world. Third, the possible
impact on the United States economy if military exports are
restricted to the year 2000.
12. 012
When the United States exports large quantities of
military equipment, the U.S. economy receives benefits in
terms of domestic income and employment generated from these
sales. In addition, commercial firms benefit from these
government-to-government because a large military arms trade
keeps the industrial base moving when other commercial orders
have fallen off. With the United States facing increased
budget cuts to reduce the deficits, a large arms trade can be
used to reduce that deficit in terms of direct and indirect
income generated by these sales. The object of this question
is to apply the 36b Congressional Notification data to a model
to determine the impact on the U.S. ecomony.
By asking the same ten standardized questions of each
case, a focussed comparison of the Carter and Reagan Adminis-
tration's 36b Notifications and foreign policy objectives in
the Persian Gulf can be accomplished. In addition with the
36b Notification data and information, the last two questions
can examined.
Before beginning the case studies, an examination of




When a process involves power, authority, culture, consen-
sus, and conflict, it captures a great deal of national
political life. (Wildavsky, p. xiii)
Arms transfers are not simply buyer-seller transactions.
In order to produce a worthwhile study the various perspec-
tives should be reviewed. These perspectives involve the
relationship between historical background, Congressional
power, and public policy as represented by the President.
A. HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
A systemic analysis of armed confrontations, scholarly and
popular literature clearly demonstrates that the employment
of nuclear weapons is diminishing as an influence on the
stability of one country's ideology over another. In fact,
nations with a nuclear weapons delivery capability have
elected not to use this type of weaponry in every case but
one. The trend of projecting military strength is moving
towards conventional weapons and tactics. This is not to
downplay the political importance nor the technical credita-
bility that a nation receives when it goes "nuclear." Yet,
there is a clear indicator that a nation's political-military
influence is directly related to an ability to organize,
train, arm and project a conventional weapons capability. The
two examples that come to mind are the Soviet Union's invasion
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of Afghanistan and the United States involvement in Vietnam.
In both instances there appeared to be an unstated commitment
not to use nuclear weapons to assure victory, though clearly
both superpowers had the capability. Both superpowers
willingly committed troops, conventional arms, and organiza-
tional skills in an attempt to sway the outcome of the
conflict. The fact that neither superpower was successful
proves the point of a diminishing deterrence capability of
nuclear weapons.
Another approach in the sphere of political-military
influence has been the economic sanction. The basic assump-
tion is: If Country A is economically blacklisted by Country
B, a major world economic power, then an automatic economic
ban is invoked by those nations politically aligned with
Country B. Theoretically, Country A will find it extremely
difficult to survive economically and therefore a change in
political attitude is promoted without military response. In
the case of the United States foreign policy objectives, the
results of this methodology have been mixed. No one can deny
that economic sanctions against Iran essentially shut them out
of the world's arms, commercial goods and services market.
On the other hand, economic sanctions against the Soviet
Union, Israel and South Africa have not worked. In fact they
have backfired. The Soviet Union was able to purchase their
grain from other countries in large enough quantities so that
the "wheat" embargo imposed by the United States was not
13
effective. For Israel and South Africa the embargo on
military supplies and small caliber weapons compelled them to
develop their own production facilities and in some areas they
are in competition with the United States.
Since 1975 almost every middle eastern government has
spent over 25% of its central government expenditures for the
military arms and services (Figure 2.1).
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
YEAR
Source: ("World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1987," p. 45)
Figure 2.1 Percentage of Military Expenditures per
Central Government Expenditures
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These budget increases have contributed to a substantial
growth in standing forces and subsequently placed new demands
on the quality and quantity of arms in the conventional
weapons market. These demands are significant in that they
carry the implication that every Third World country is
looking for a supplier for their conventional arms needs.
Further, this implication has increased pressure on First and
Second World countries to develop a workable foreign policy
and mandates a definition of their position regarding arms
transfers and sales on the world's political stage.
These new demands have in effect caused industrialized
nations to increase their own military expenditures to produce
more complex conventional weapons. This increase in innova-
tion is the catalyst which drives the reactions among Third
World arms recipients. These reactions include an increased
level of sophistication and development of deadlier weapons.
When technology is combined with larger standing forces,
regional conflicts will be more dangerous for the combatants.
Additionally, the conflict may spread to neighboring states.
Another implication is that an arms transfer is the
primary method used by nation-states to improve their military
capabilities with modern conventional weaponry. With the ease
in obtaining conventional weapons, the superpowers have found
that they can no longer influence smaller nations from
fighting. For example, the Soviet Union tried to de-escalate
the Iran-Iraq War by slowing down the transfer of weapons to
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Iraq. Iraq turned to the world arms market and acquired
weapons from France and West Germany with no political strings
attached (Papp, p. 412)
.
The motivation for industrialized countries to sell and
ship arms can be grouped into either a political sphere, an
economic sphere or a combination of both.
Politically the struggle for dominance between East and
West plays the major role in all arms sales or transfers. The
two major suppliers, the Soviet Union and United States, seek
not only expansion of their political ideologies, but also
desire to secure base rights, overseas facilities, and transit
rights to support the deployment and operations of military
forces and intelligence systems. Recently another factor has
been realized. If the United States does not offer arms
sales, others such as France or Brazil, will step in and do
so. The Third World recipient that lacks funds or raw mater-
ials to barter are the most vulnerable to political string
pulling. On the other hand the Middle East oil-rich states
have the cash and will not hesitate to turn to other willing
suppliers. Additionally, a transfer of arms supports diplo-
matic efforts to resolve major regional conflicts by main-
taining an equal balance to a friendly or regionally dominant
state. This strategy of influence often precludes a more
direct form of military involvement. Another political
strategy is to enhance the quality and commonality of the
capabilities of major Allies participating in joint defense
16
arrangements. This tactic serves to influence the military
elite and provide leverage with individual governments on
specific issues. (Papp, p. 413)
Economically, for the United States and other Western
nations, arms sales mean money. Cash is playing a more
important role in the economic deficit and in equalizing the
international balance of trade payments. Other economic
benefits are: a) the increase in total production resulting
from weapons sold overseas reduces unit cost of domestically
used weapons. This results from an increase in the total
baseline over which the research, development and production
set-up costs are amortized; b) foreign sales provide a place
to deplete older inventories of weapons no longer used. Since
the demand for newer technology drives suppliers to devote
more expertise in the development of more modern weapons, a
self-perpetuating cycle is generated; c) arms sales provides
stable employment in the short-run and keeps the military in-
dustry operating at a wartime level just in case a long-run
need should arise; and d) the sale of weapons can open the
door for an inflow of raw materials, and possibly development
of a civilian non-military market for other goods and ser-
vices. (Papp, p. 414; Brzoska, p. 125)
B. LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE
United States foreign aid in the form of security assis-
tance to Third World nations communicates a powerful message
to developing nations as well as the rest of the world.
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Security assistance in the form of military equipment and
related services is perceived as support for the independence
and protection by the United States for those Third World
nations. More importantly, in spite of waning budgets and
Administration and Congressional entanglements, it is a
commitment by the Presidential Administration to promote more
democratic forms of government, promotion of human rights and
a strong deterrent to communism. This perception of unity
with the United States is often more important than the actual
amount of aid. The program, however, must follow up with
actual aid or creditability is lost.
Congressional initiatives of the early 1970' s marked the
beginning of more effective controls over United States
government arms sales and transfers. These efforts culminated
in 1976 with the passage of the International Security Assis-
tance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) . Prior to an in-
creased Congressional awareness the President had somewhat of
a free hand to send arms and supplies to other allies when he
deemed appropriate. The Administration's usual reason was,
arms were transferred to ensure strength through military and
economic assistance to friends of the United States. In fact
up until the passage of AECA, the most significant Congres-
sional initiative was the adoption of a provision permitting
Congress to disapprove a major arms sale. The major focus of
Congressional control incorporated by the AECA act was:
1) To adopt a provision permitting Congress to disapprove
a major arms sale,
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2) To require an annual report describing and justifying
the following year's arms transfer program. This is an
expansion of an existing quarterly reporting requirement
that was intended to keep Congress apprised of the
status of arms exports,
3) Requirement of a Statutory Congressional Notification:
(Section 36b) that states: The Administration must
notify Congress 30 days before issuing a letter of offer
to sell defense articles and services for $50 million or
more, design and construction services for $200 million
or more, or major defense equipment for $14 million or
more to a foreign country or international organization.
It must notify Congress 15 days before issuing a Letter
of Offer to Sell for such sales to NATO, NATO member
nations, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand. This statu-
tory notification must be sent to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senat
Foreign Relations Committee. It must contain the
following information: name of the proposed recipient,
amount of the sale in US dollars, amount and description
of the equipment, impact on US munitions stocks, and
justification for the sale,
4) Additional reports includes information concerning
issuance of commercial export licenses for major
weapons, possible violations of an arms sales agreement,
proposed third world country transfers of United States
supplied weapons, and a listing of agent fees paid or
offered by United States defense contractors to win an
overseas sale (U.S. Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Changing Perspectives, pp. 8-9)
,
5) Requirement that the Administration will consider
several other issues before proceeding with foreign
military aid and sale including: nuclear transfers;
acts of discrimination against U.S. nationals on the
basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex;
protection of terrorists by recipient nations; and
impact of sales on U.S. combat readiness.
The AECA charges the Secretary of State with administering
the Security Assistance program. Since the Department of
Defense (DOD) has the majority of the arms, military services
and expertise, primary action office for security assistance
has been delegated to DOD and is called the Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA) . DSAA is responsible for planning,
19
administering, and accounting for all DOD involvement with
Security Assistance. The Director of DSAA reports to the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and works closely with
the State Department.
The funds for security assistance are appropriated to the
President as a part of the United States annual budget and are
to be administered by the State Department. In addition they
are separate from the funds appropriated for national defense.
The Comptroller General is responsible for ruling (based on
General Accounting reports) on the legality of the uses of
funds within the Security Assistance program by Department of
State or by any of the DOD departments.
DOD must be compensated from the security assistance funds
for any equipment or services it provides but are not allowed
to make a profit or sustain a loss for the equipment or
services. Instead DOD can charge a higher price for amortiza-
tion of equipment research and development, and for service
costs incurred in administration of the security assistance
program. These two provisos normally averages to a premium of
nine percent above DOD's actual procurement and operations
costs. (U.S. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, pp.
23-24)
C. EXECUTIVE PERSPECTIVE
1. President Carter's Arms Transfer Policy
On May 19, 1977, President Carter announced his
Administration's policy regarding the transfer of conventional
20
arms sales to foreign countries by the United States. His
policy was, in effect, a continuation of the Congressional
initiatives.
"Henceforth", said President Carter, "the use of
conventional arms transfers would be viewed as an exceptional
foreign policy implement , to be used only in instances where
it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes
to our national security interests." The policy went on to
establish a set of controls and checks on all foreign arms
sales with the exception of NATO members, Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand. The Carter controls were to be binding on
sales to non-exempted nations unless "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" necessitated a Presidential waiver of them or the
President determined that "advanced weaponry" needed to be
sold to nations friendly to the U.S. to offset quantitative
or other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional
balance." (U.S. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer
Policy, p. 10) The policy included the following objectives:
1) A "ceiling" on the dollar volume of arms sales and
related services would be reduced in fiscal year 1978
below the fiscal year 1977 total. This does not include
the four exceptions noted above,
2) A reduction in the sale of sophisticated and costly U.S.
weaponry by imposing qualitative restrictions on U.S.
arms sales.
The qualitative restrictions of 2) included guidelines that
forbid:
a) First introduction into a region by the U.S. of a
newly developed, advanced weapons system which could
create a new or significantly higher combat capa-
bility,
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b) Most major co-production agreements with foreign
governments, with restrictions on Third Country
exports for those entered into,
c) Development or significant modification of advanced
weapons system solely for export,
d) Sale of newly developed, advanced weapons until they
were operationally deployed with U.S. forces.
3) The "burden of persuasion" would be placed on the propo-
nents, not the opponents, of an arms sale,
4) An attempt would be made to remove the incentive to
promote foreign arms sales in order to lower the unit
costs for the Department of Defense,
5) An effort to dampen arms sales promotion by forbidding
all U.S. embassies and military representatives to
promote arms sales. Not permitting commercial agents to
promote their weaponry unless prior authorization had
been received form the State Department,
6) An overt attempt to curtail worldwide arms sales through
multinational cooperative agreements with arms sup-
pliers,
7) U.S. security assistance programs will work hand-in-hand
with the Congress to promote and advance respect of
human rights in recipient countries. Also the economic
impact of arms transfers to countries receiving economic
assistance was to be considered (U.S. Changing Perspec-
tives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, pp. 11-12).
This new political perspective of controlling arms
sales with a ceiling and making an clear effort to cooperate
with Congress was a radical departure from previous adminis-
trations. Both Presidents Nixon and Ford were at odds with
Congress over what was perceived as increased micromanagement
of their foreign policy objectives (Changing Perspectives on
U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, p. 12).
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2 . President Reagan's Arms Transfer Policy
On July 8, 1981, President Reagan signed a directive
on conventional arms transfer policy that set the tone for a
new U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan policy directive em-
phasized what the Administration viewed as a significant
growth in recent years of "challenges and hostility toward
fundamental United States interests, and the interests of its
friends and allies." Such trends could "threaten stability
in many regions" and "progress toward greater political and
economic development." (U.S. Changing Perspectives on U.S.
Arms Transfer Policy, p. 32)
The directive went on to point out that the U.S. must
be prepared to help its friends and allies through arms
transfer and other forms of security assistance. "Such
transfers," the policy directive states, "component American
security commitments and serve important United States
objectives." In this context, the Reagan Administration
viewed conventional arms transfers and transfers of other
defense articles and services as "an essential element of its
global defense posture and an indispensable component of its
foreign policy." His objectives were laid out as follows:
1) Help deter aggression by enhancing preparedness of
friends and allies,
2) Increased effectiveness of U.S. armed forces by working
directly with armed forces of allies and friends, and to
project power in response to threats posed by mutual
adversaries,
3) To deploy and operate with allies on a global scale.
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4) To demonstrate U.S. interest by not allowing allies and
friends to be at a military disadvantage,
5) To foster regional and internal stability by encouraging
peaceful resolution of disagreements,
6) Help to enhance United States defense production capa-
bilities and efficiency. (U.S. Changing Perspectives on
U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, pp. 32-33)
The Reagan policy directive emphasizes that the U.S.
will "evaluate requests primarily in terms of their net
contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense." It also set
out broad guidance regarding the transfer of weapons and
generally related items. These policy provisions stipulate
that:
1) Co-production requests and those for transfer of "sen-
sitive or advanced technology will receive special
scrutiny,
"
2) To help avoid any adverse impact on friendly and allied
nations by encouraging them to assume burdens for which
their economies are ill-prepared, "careful consideration
will be given to lower-cost alternatives including
adaptations of military equipment for sale abroad." It
is recognized that "first-line systems may not suit the
needs of many countries." Accordingly, "consideration
of the full range of available American alternatives
will take place at every stage of the review,"
3) U.S. representatives overseas "will be expected to
provide the same courtesies and assistance to firms that
have obtained licenses to market items on the United
States Munitions List as they would to those marketing
other American products." (U.S. Changing Perspectives
on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, pp. 33-34)
Finally, the policy directive notes that the United
States retains a general interest in arms transfer restraint,
but will not "jeopardize it own security need through a
program of unilateral restraint." (U.S. Changing Perspectives
on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, p. 34)
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Before beginning the case studies, it is desirable to
examine the mechanisms that were used for gathering, compiling
and evaluating the financial and foreign policy that surrounds
foreign military sales.
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III. PROPOSED ARMS SALES AS MEASUREMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
A. METHODOLOGY
Louscher and Salomone point out that most research
documentation and subsequent publication of United States arms
sales and transfer policies are plagued by eight recurring
errors. They explain that these errors stem from methodologi-
cal processes as well as a general availability of resource
material that is incomplete and inaccurate (Louscher and
Salomone, pp. 22-25) . These flaws are characterized by:
1) Frequent use of current dollars as the unit of measure-
ment,
2) A focus on foreign military sales alone,
3) A focus on arms sales agreements alone,
4) A use of truncated time frames,
5) Limited differentiation of recipients,
6) Failure to link arms sales and transfers to United
States foreign policy priorities,
7) Failure to differentiate types of defense articles and
services,
8) Use of nonisomorphic data.
The reason for some of these errors was prior to 1976
information about United States arms sales and transfer data
was not easily accessible. In fact, it was sketchy at best.
President Ford unclogged this informational chokepoint by
signing into law the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) in the
closing months of his Presidency.
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The AECA was not designed to stop or curtail arms sales or
transfer that were necessary for the support and defense of
allies, but was enacted to provide a paper trail for those
arms to third world countries. Prior to the AECA, the
President, or by his direction to the State Department, had a
free hand in transferring military arms and services anywhere
in the world without notifying anyone. In addition, attempts
to track governmental military arms sales or services was
further exacerbated by a lack of follow-on public records
after actual the transfer took place. The source data
consisted of weapons that were confirmed and observed to be
in place.
The AECA contains two provisions that make classification
and pursuit of proposed arms sales or transfers somewhat
easier. First it was a Congressional mandate to all conse-
quent Presidential Administrations to provide and publish
information concerning proposed arms sales and transfers.
This information was to be transmitted to Congress in a formal
letter thirty days prior to signing a Letter of Offer to Sell.
The letter was to contain the recipient, the amount of the
proposed sale, a listing of equipment and a justification
paragraph. As a matter of convenience and ease of understand-
ing, the amount of the proposed arms sale or transfer is to be
linked to a monetary threshold. These thresholds are: a)
defense articles and services of $50 million or more; b)
design and construction services for $200 million or more; and
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c) major defense equipment of $14 million or more to a foreign
country or international organization. (U.S. Military Sales
Laws, p. 29)
Although these criteria cannot cover all proposed arms
sales and transfers (i.e., those that fall below the monetary
thresholds) , it does provide important pieces to the puzzle of
what was sent to whom and for how much. Also when considering
the cost of modern first-line military equipment in the late
1970 's, a monetary threshold of this magnitude was not un-
realistic. For example, an F-16 costs approximately $10
million and no country would attempt a buy of just one modern
U.S. jet fighter.
The second provision of the AECA permitted Congress to
disapprove a major arms sale. The Congressional mood at the
time was that they should play a greater role in all arms
sales and transfers to foreign countries or international
organizations. With this clause the House and Senate would be
able to enforce greater restrictions and possibly tighter
controls on arms sales or transfers brought to their attention
by the legislated monetary threshold. It also provided a
vehicle for two additional Congressional concerns; the
worldwide concern for human rights and the continuing transfer
of first-line U.S. military hardware to the volatile Middle
East. Thus far, Congress has chosen not to use this option
but does use the threat of its use to warn the administration
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to take a second look at the request before it reaches the
Senate floor for debate.
B. SCOPE OF THESIS DATA
This thesis uses a database created from the AECA 36b
Congressional Notifications from October 1, 1977 to September
30, 1988. The data were accumulated independently from two
sources; the daily Senate Proceedings from October 1977
through September 1988 and an unclassified listing of proposed
arms sales provided by Defense Security Assistance Agency
(DSAA) in Washington D.C.
My research consisted of a detailed examination of the
daily Senate Proceedings, from October 1977 through September
1988 to accumulate copies of the formal 36b Notifications
letters. This method was conducted twice to ensure complete-
ness and when finished produced 602 formal notification
letters. The listing of unclassified proposed arms sales
received from DSAA contained 689 records. The contents of
both research efforts were compared to correct any discrepan-
cies and ensure completeness and consistency. The comparison
resulted in a total of 720 records of proposed arms sales and
transfer.
The differences between the two research efforts can be
explained as follows. First, the data file of 36b Notifica-
tions from the Senate Proceedings has all formal notification
letters including those with only proposed recipient and
dollar amount but the list of equipment was deleted for
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classified reasons. Records of this type were not included in
the DSAA data listing. The remaining 36b Notifications that
were in the DSAA data listing were not reprinted in the daily
Senate Proceedings. Each record was checked a third and final
time accuracy. It is believed that this database of proposed
arms sales and transfers is complete and does not overlap time
periods or double-count funds and equipment. This database
provides the researcher three things.
First, it provides a true and accurate accounting of
proposed arms sales and transfers by the United States during
President Carter and both President Reagan's Administrations.
Second, it contributes to the question posed by Laurance
and Sherwin in 1978 that to date has not been completely
answered: "None of these. . .questions can be answered confi-
dently without first creating valid and reliable data on arms
transfers. Thus it is important to ask what arms transfer
data are available and how useful are they?" (Laurance and
Sherwin, p. 88) This database is valid and reliable.
Finally, the database provides a valid comparative
baseline that is not connected with declassified figures
generated by the U.S. government's intelligence services or an
interpretation of observed data by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute. It comes from public records.
Specifically the database provides the following:
1) The date of the transaction, the dollar figure, equip-
ment type, a list of equipment or military related ser-
vices, and the name of the recipient of a proposed sale
of United States military arms and services,
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2) It does not focus strictly on foreign military sales and
agreements. The 36b Congressional Notification is
required prior to a Letter of Offer and Acceptance or
any signed agreement to sell any military arms or ser-
vices,
3) It concentrates on specific time periods (fiscal years)
and identifies recipients,
4) When tabulated it provides a dollar amount for each
particular fiscal year and differentiates between types
of proposed defense articles and services for sale,
5) It can link arms sales and transfers to the foreign
policy priorities of the United States. The 36b
Congressional Notification originates from the Executive
Branch, therefore it is a statement of the real foreign
policy priorities of the Oval Office vice published
broad policy directives.
This database does not mean that the arms sale or transfer
actually took place. Only the signed sales agreements show
this (Figure 3.1). This database, however, gives a clearer
representation of what each administration was willing to sell
to a foreign country or international organization. The
material extracted from the database supports an opinion of
which middle eastern country had priority and what kind of
military equipment the United States government was willing
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Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 3.1 Proposed Arms Sales Persian Gulf versus World
($$$ in Millions)
It is with this confidence in the database of 36b Congres-
sional Notifications that we can now examine the six cases.
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IV. PERSIAN GULF
Figure 4.1 shows the entire Persian Gulf area and provides
a geographic perspective for the case studies which follow.
Figure 4.1 Persian Gulf
A. SAUDI ARABIA
1 . Is the United States the Sole or Predominant Supplier
of Military Arms?
Until 1987 the United States was the predominant
supplier of military arms and related construction services
for Saudi Arabia. From 1950 to 1977, Saudi Arabia depended on
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the United States for training and a number of other Western
sources for military supplies and services. In 1978 the
United States logically shifted some of its political emphasis
in the Gulf to Saudi Arabia because of Iran's domestic unrest.
After the fall of Iran's government in 1979, the political and
strategic importance of Saudi Arabia increased exponentially.
From this point in time the United States has clearly tried to
dominate sales agreements (including construction) with Saudi
Arabia. In fact Saudi Arabia has surpassed Israel in recipi-
ent shares in United States exports of major weapons from 1982
to 1986 (SIPRI, p. 191). Whether the United States will
remain the predominant supplier remains to be seen. The
fierce congressional debates over the F-15 and the E-3A sales
reinforced the Saudi apprehensions over the United States
ability to remain a reliable supplier of military equipment
(Cordesman, p. 252). Even with the substantial increase of
United States military arms and services, the Saudis kept an
open communication with Italy and France for naval equipment
and with West Germany for equipment for the Saudi National
Guard (Cordesman, p. 253) . Recently, the Saudis have signed
a Letter of Agreement with Great Britain for 72 Tornado jet
fighters to include air-to-air and air-to-ship missiles for
$5.5 billion (SIPRI, p. 262). This sales agreement will
eventually lead to other follow-on agreements for advanced
training and maintenance support.
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2 . What was the Total Dollar Amount of the 36b Congres-
sional Notifications During the Carter and Reagan
Administrations ?
The total dollar amount of proposed arms sales or
transfers during the three administrations by fiscal year are
as shown in Table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1
TOTAL PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS FOR SAUDI ARABIA

















Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 01, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
3 . Did the Dollar Amount of the 36b Congressional Notifi-
cations Increase or Decrease During the Carter and
Reagan Administrations ?
Figure 4.2 contrasts the proposed arms sales or
transfers to Saudi Arabia compared to the amount of proposals
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Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.2 Proposed Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia
versus Persian Gulf
Figure 4 . 2 shows a steady decrease in the Carter
Administration arms sales or transfer proposals for Saudi
Arabia from a high of $6,501 millions in fiscal year 1978 to
$4,571 millions in fiscal year 1980. Fiscal year 1977 shows
no proposed arms sales or transfers were made. During the
first year of the first Reagan Administration, tremendous
increases in proposals to Saudi Arabia were made. In fiscal
year 1981, there is a substantial increase in proposed arms
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sales valued at $15,326 millions. This is attributed to the
proposed sale and subsequent agreement of the E-3A Sentry
AWACS system. Yet, from fiscal year 1982 to the end fiscal
year 1988 (the second Reagan Administration) the graph shows
a dramatic decline in proposed arms sales or transfers with an
average of $1,580 millions per year.
4
.
What are the Anticipated Payment Terms ?
Saudi Arabia has not relied on the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) or the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program
for any major purchases of military equipment or services
since 1974. Prior to 1974 Saudi Arabia used grants and
guaranteed loans for training their military officers,
totaling $25.3 million, and a relatively small amount of
military equipment and construction totaling $254.2 million
(DSAA, pp. 24,60,84). Since 1974 Saudi Arabia has consistent-
ly paid cash for all transactions involving military arms and
services. This is because of the ability to pay due to large
reserves of funds from oil sale receipts. An equally impor-
tant reason is their heritage of anti-colonialism that has
blossomed into a fervent desire for a "no political strings
attached" arms buying policy. There is no reason to believe
that this policy will change.
5. What is the Quantity of Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The quantity of United States proposed military arms
and related services to Saudi Arabia has been high. Table 4.2
separates the 36b Congressional Notification data into two
37
categories: construction/training and military arms/asso-
ciated support equipment, but for ranking purposes they are
added together.
TABLE 4.2
PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS TO SAUDI ARABIA BY CATEGORY
(in millions of Dollars)
Administration Fiscal Year Construct/Train Arms/Support
Carter 1978 $ 3,951 $ 2,550
1979 5,135 691
1980 3,682 889









Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
6. What was the Quality of the Proposed Arms Transfer?
The arms sales or transfer proposals to Saudi Arabia
in absolute terms is a wide spectrum of unsophisticated
weapons to the top-of-the-line in modern technology (Table
4.3) . The Carter Administration concentrated on assisting the
modernization of the Saudi military rather than sending highly
technical weaponry. For example a proposed sale of 60 F-15's
in 1978 was only a moderate gain in capability since it did
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TABLE 4.3
PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA
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1978 75.0 UNKNOWN CLAS-
SIFIED
1978 50.0 65 HARPOON MIS-
SILES
1978 1,300.0 THREE YEARS
SUPPORT FOR PEACE
HAWK
















1978 800.0 TWO SHIP REPAIR
FACILITIES
1979 147.6 AMENDMENT FOR
ORDNANCE CORPS
PROGRAM
1979 93.5 100 HARPOON
MISSILES
1979 44.3 172 DRAGON ANTI-
TANK TRACKERS AND
4 2 92 DRAGON
MISSILES
1979 238.0 CONSTRUCTION OF
ENGINEER SCHOOL




1979 14.8 5 VULCAN AIR
DEFENSE SYSTEMS




1979 426.0 SUPPORT FOR F-15
PROGRAM
1979 1.171.9 CONTRACTOR TECH-
NICAL ASSISTANCE
1979 24.3 15 M7 2 8 COMBAT
VEHICLES







3 2 M6 0A1 TANKS
CHASSIS
1979 7 0.6 FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT
FOR SAUDI NAVAL
EXPANSION
1979 4 60.0 CONSTRUCTION AND
OTHER RELATED
PROCUREMENT




1979 1,433.0 ADDITIONAL TECH-
NICAL SERVICES
AND SUPPORT
1980 44.3 49 00 DRAGON ANTI-
TANK MISSILES
1980 77.5 140,000 ROUNDS OF
MORTAR, HOWITZER,













1980 12.7 50 TOW GUIDED
MISSILE LAUNCHERS
AND 1000 MISSILES







Fiscal Year Amount Equipment
1980 53.0 2 F-15C AIRCRAFT
TO BE RETAINED IN
U.S. FOR IMMEDI-
ATE REPLACEMENT










1980 3 0.0 CONSTRUCTIONS FOR
COMMAND AND
OPERATIONS CENTER
1980 70.0 14 F-15 ENGINES
AND 71 SPARE
ENGINE MODULES
1980 96.8 158 TANK CONVER-
SION KITS
1980 120.0 1000 CBU-58
MUNITIONS, 1000
CBU-71 MUNITIONS,
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Administration Fiscal Year Amount Equipment
1981 232.0 1177 AIM-9L
MISSILES








1981 3 0.0 COOPERATIVE
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CONTRACT









1981 48.0 FLIGHT SERVICES
TRAINING FOR
FISCAL YEAR 8 2
1981 9.0 18 155MM TOWED
HOWITZERS
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1981 9 00.0 MANAGEMENT AND
CONTRACTOR SER-
VICES FOR 500 BED
HOSPITAL FOR
SAUDI NAT'L GUARD
1981 5,800.0 FIVE E-3A AWACS
AIRCRAFT WITH
SUPPORT FOR THREE
YEAR AND IN CONUS
TRAINING
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SYSTEM WITH
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3 TPS-4 3V CON-
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1981 42.0 500 FIVE-TON
CARGO TRUCKS
1981 30.0 OPERATIONS AND
COMMAND CENTER
1982 22.0 2010 I-TOW MIS-
SILES






























Administration Fiscal Year Amount Equipment





1983 31.0 ADDITION CONTRACT
FOR TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE







1983 130.0 POST SHIP DELIV-
ERY SUPPORT AND
SERVICES
1983 26.0 2538 I-TOW MIS-
SILES
1983 33.0 42 155MM TOWED
HOWITZERS











1984 126.0 192,016 ROUNDS OF
155MM AMMO
1984 176.0 100 M60A3 TANKS




Administration Fiscal Year Amount Equipment
1984 350.0 10 RF-5E AIRCRAFT
4 F-5E AIRCRAFT 1
F-5F AIRCRAFT
WITH SUPPORT








1984 1,500.0 ADDITIONAL CON-
TRACTOR TECHNICAL
SERVICES




1984 61.0 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
FOR U.S. ORIGIN
SYSTEMS
1984 271.0 52 3 TRACKED
ARMORED VEHICLES

























1986 107.0 100 AIR LAUNCHED
HARPOONS
1986 60.0 671 AIM-9L MIS-
SILES
1986 202.0 2263 TRUCKS, 1389
TRAILERS, AND 129
AMBULANCES




1986 500.0 TECHNICAL SER-
VICES FOR F-15
AIRCRAFT
1987 325.0 95 AN/ALQ-171 ECM
SYSTEMS FOR F-5
AND F-15
1987 400.0 12 UH-60 BLACK-
HAWK VIP HELOS,
15 BELL 4 06 HELOS
WITH 7.62MM GUNS







400.0 ADDITIONAL 13 UH-
60 BLACKHAWK
HELOS AND 15 BELL
4 06 HELOS






Administration Fiscal Year Amount Equipment
1988 502.0 12 F15C/D RE-
PLACEMENT AIR-
CRAFT





Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceeding,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
not include the conformal wing tanks to extend the range and
was fitted with lesser capable models of the AIM-9F Sidewinder
and AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air missiles.
It was not until the Reagan Administration that the
transfer of state-of-the-art weaponry became available. The
proposed and subseguent sale and transfer of the E-3A AWACS
aircraft in 1981 was and still is the very best in United
States technology. This was followed by proposals for over
4,000 improved TOW missiles, and 101 (202 tanks) sets of
conformal fuel tanks for the Saudi F-15's. The conformal
tanks increase the F-15 range to reach any part of the entire
Middle East.
The proposed high technology transfers continued in
1984 with an additional 2500 improved TOW missiles, 200 basic
Stinger missile systems with 400 missiles, and a vast array
of modern tracked combat vehicles.
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In 1986 proposed construction contracts dropped to
zero and proposals for arms leveled out to about $1 billion a
year. The specific military equipment includes, an additional
200 Stinger missile systems with 600 missiles, 100 air-
launched Harpoon missiles, 95 AN/ALQ-171 airborne Electronic
Counter Measures equipment, and over 1500 upgraded models of
the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile.
From the perspective of the proposed United States
arms sales or transfer listing in Table 4.3, Saudi Arabia is
one of the best equipped military forces in the Middle East.
However, the Saudis question the reliability of the United
States as a supplier in the future because of the heated
debates in Congress whenever a proposal is made in their
behalf by the administration. This is evident due to the
recent agreement with Great Britain to purchase the 72 Tornado
fighter aircraft including an extensive spare parts and
missile support clause. With this addition of military
equipment Saudi Arabia has a very high capability when
compared to many of their opposing ideological neighbors.
7 . Is the Recipient a Major United States or Western
Oil Supplier?
Saudi Arabia owns the largest known oil reserves in
the world. One source estimates the total reserve to be 165
billion barrels, which is almost three times more that any
other country in the world (Cordesman, p. 21) . Other sources
(Economist, pp. 19-20; Middle East Economic Digest, p. 42; New
York Times, 10 Feb 1982) report that Saudi Arabia had proven
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reserves of 110 billion barrels and additional probable
reserves of 180 billion barrels. The added number of reserves
comes from recent exploration in the empty quarter and
northern areas. In any case, Saudi Arabia is the largest
producer of crude oil in the entire Persian Gulf region. The
United States has reduced its overall dependence on Gulf oil
and now averages approximately 5% of its needs (Berkowitz, p.
198) . The majority of Saudi oil goes to Western Europe, which
includes Great Britain, West Germany, and France which when
combined are moderate importers. Japan is considered a minor
recipient of Saudi oil with imports less than 40% of total oil
import needs.
8 . How Strategically Important is the Recipient's
Geographic Location ?
Saudi Arabia is the center of the Middle East in
geographic location, ideology and economic stability.
Geographically in the sense that it is one of the largest
Middle Eastern countries with an area of 830,000 square miles
and with two of its coastline borders on the Persian Gulf and
the Red Sea (Figure 4.3).
Bordering the Persian Gulf obviously states its
importance to the world with regard to accessing oil. With
its border on the Red Sea, it strategically borders the Suez
Canal as one of the five keys to lock up the world (Till, p.
83) . It is the ideological center of the Middle East because
the Saudis are the Guardians of Islam. Mecca, the geographic
heart and soul of Islam, is in Saudi Arabia and they have the
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Figure 4 . 3 SAUDI ARABIA
responsibility of keeping Islam's holiest place safe and open
for all Muslims to make the yearly pilgrimage. Economically,
Saudi Arabia has the largest known oil reserves in the world
and exports three times as much crude oil as its next competi-
tor, the Soviet Union (Cordesman, p. 4) .
The Saudi geostrategic importance is high because the
Soviet Union exerts a high ideological influence and military
arms support for Syria and South Yemen. These two countries
are extremely important to the Soviet Union for establishing
a presence in the area as well as port and repair facilities.
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9 . Were There Any Significant Events Affecting the
Value of Access ?
The significant events are as follows:
1) Arab-Israeli War in June 1967,
2) Withdrawal of Great Britain from the East of Suez and
all Gulf Commitments in January 1968,
3) Military Assistance Agreement between South Yemen and
the Soviet Union in August 1968,
4) Formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries in 1970,
5) Syria signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet
Union in April 1972,
6) Arab-Israeli War in October 1973,
7) Oil Crisis in 1973 that resulted in a three fold
increase in oil prices,
8) Fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979,
9) Oil Crisis in 1979 that resulted in another increase in
oil prices,
10) The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan in December 1979,
11) Irag invades Iran in September 1980,
12) Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982,
13) United States agrees to re-flag and escort Kuwaiti oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf in October 1987,
14) Cease-fire in the Iran-Irag War in August 1988.
These events have affected the relationship with the
United States both politically and economically. Saudi
Arabia's role in the Middle East is very deliberate and yet
very supportive of Islamic, primarily Sunni, countries and
their causes. This puts them in an adversarial role with the
United States with regard to Israel. On the other hand, the
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United States has the best military equipment and support
services and in order to preserve their own automony, they
must deal with the United States.
10. Who is the Major Military Arms and Related Services
Supplier to Adjacent Adversaries ?
There are three countries that could pose a threat for
Saudi Arabia in the future with regard to their regional and
internal security. They are: Iran, Iraq and Syria. The
Soviet union is the predominant supplier for both Iraq and
Syria. Syria has a military letter of agreement with the
Soviet Union, whereas Iraq buys the weapons from the Soviet
Union strictly with a buyer-seller arrangement. Iran does not
have any particular arms supplier. Table 4.4 is a comparison
of major weapons system and proposed arms sale during the
Carter administration and both Reagan administrations.
B. OMAN
1 . Is the United States the Sole or Predominant Supplier
of Military Arms?
The United States is not the sole or predominant
supplier of military arms and related services for Oman.
Until 1980, historica trends in actual arms transfers shows
that Britain has been the major supplier of military equipment
(Cordesman, p. 897) . However, since 1980, Oman has made
purchases from the United States and France. Additional
purchases from these suppliers will cause the predominant arms
sales trend to shift away from Britain. The reason for the
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SIPRI, pp. 249-266; Proposed Arms Sales for
Saudi Arabia compiled by author from U.S.
Senate Proceedings, October 1, 1977 to
September 30, 1988.
alignment with the United States because of the threats that
Iran and Yemen posed to the Sultanate (Cordesman, p. 897) .
With the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War and constructive
talks with Yemen to settle border disputes, the trend may
again shift. But as of September 1988, the Oman Sultanate had
not made overtures to end the military arms and aid
agreements.
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The second reason that Oman chose to purchase military
supplies from the United States was that the United States is
willing to give military aid. Britain proposed to sell Oman
advanced fighter aircraft, but had postponed delivery until
1991 because of a lack of funding (SIPRI, pp. 258-9). The
United States, on the other hand, needed staging facilities
for operations in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, an agreement
was reached whereby Oman would provide a major United States
staging facility at Al Misirah Island, in the Arabian Sea, and
the United States would provide security assistance guarantees
and military equipment. This arrangement has worked out very
well for Oman and the United States and from this perspective
there is no reason to believe that it will end in the near
future.
2. What was the Total Dollar Amount of the 36b
Congressional Notifications During the Carter
and Reagan Administrations ?
The total dollar amounts of proposed arms sales or
transfers during the three administrations by fiscal year are
shown in Table 4.5.
3
.
Did the Dollar Amount of the 36b Congressional
Notifications Increase or Decrease During the
Carter and Reagan Administrations?
Figure 4.4 contrasts the proposed arms sales or
transfers to Oman compared to the amount of proposals to the
Persian Gulf by fiscal year.
Figure 4.4 shows the small amount of proposed arms
sales to Oman when compared to the rest of the Persian Gulf.
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TABLE 4.5
TOTAL PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS FOR OMAN




















Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
It shows an increase in proposed arms sales in the transition
from the Carter to the beginning of the first Reagan Ad-
ministration. Then a marked decrease from the first Reagan
Administration through the second Reagan administration.
4 . What are the Anticipated Payment Terms ?
Oman has not relied on the Military Assistance Program
(MAP) for any major expenditure of military equipment or
services (DSAA, p. 60) . Instead, Oman has extensively used on
the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program and has spread
out it purchases of military arms and services with $49.1
million in DOD direct loans and $150 million in DOD guaranty
loans (DSAA p. 24) . The use of financing has been necessary
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Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.4 Proposed Arms Sales for Oman versus
Persian Gulf
because of an average deficit of $350 million that Oman has
incurred since 1982 (EIU, p. 21) . Based on the decline in the
deficit in 1987 to $248 million due to a reduction in overall
government expenditures, Oman is making progress in reversing
this trend. When their reserves are restored to pre-1980
levels, Oman may not have to rely on financing.
5 . What is the Quantity of Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The quantity of United States proposed military arms
and related services to Oman has been negligible. There has
been no military construction that falls under the 36b
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Notification requirement. Table 4.6 shows the proposed arms
sales or transfers fall in the category of Arms and support
under the 36b Notification requirement.
TABLE 4.6
PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO OMAN


























Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings
from October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
6 . What was the Quality of the Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The arms sales or transfer proposals to Oman in
absolute terms is low for the Carter administration and both
Reagan administrations.
In the Carter administration there were two proposed
sales consisting of one C-130H Hercules cargo aircraft,
including maintenance support, spare parts and two years
training for the crew. In addition there was a proposed sale
of 250 AIM-9P Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to arm the
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British made Jaguar and Hunter jet fighters. In this in-
stance, a proposal to sell one cargo plane and a small number
of air-to-air missiles is considered low in absolute and
regional terms.
The arms proposals during both Reagan administrations
did not substantially change. In the first Reagan administra-
tion there were two proposals to sell an additional three c-
130H Hercules aircraft, with no mention of support, spare
parts, or training. In the second Reagan administration there
was one proposal to sell 300 AIM-9P Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles. Proposed sale of military equipment of this nature
is also considered low in absolute and regional terms.
When appraising the threats to Oman from Iran and
Yemen, the quantity and quality of the proposed arms sales
from the United States is considered is minimal. They will
not increase Oman's military capability enough to consider
them on a military par with any neighboring states.
7 . Is the Recipient a Major United States or Western
Oil Supplier?
Sources vary on the estimates of the total oil
reserves in Oman. One estimate, as of 1982, shows reserves of
2.7 billion barrels (Cordesman p. 21). A more recent source
shows a total reserve of 3.96 billion barrels as of 1986 (EIU
p. 22) . The significance of this report is that for the first
time in ten years the increase in proven reserves was less
that the volume of production for that year.
62
The United States does not regularly import any oil
from the 600,000 barrel per day production of oil in Oman.
Table 4.7 shows the top six oil recipient nations for 1986.
TABLE 4.7







Source: "The Economist Intelligence Unit,"
4th Quarter 1987, pp. 23-24.
8 . How Strategically Important is the Recipient's
Geographic Location ?
Oman has about 212,400 square kilometers of territory,
1,384 kilometers of land boundaries, and 2,092 kilometers of
coastline (Cordesman, p. 606) . Its geographic location gives
the Sultanate control of the Musandam Peninsula and the main
shipping channels at the Strait of Hormuz (Figure 4.5).
With severed diplomatic relations between Iran and the
United States, strategic access to Oman is critical. Oman's
strategic importance to the United States has increased
significantly with the agreement to open an over-the-horizon
staging point for Gulf and Indian Ocean operations at Al
Masirah Island. Al Masirah is 2000 miles closer to the
Persian Gulf than Diego Garcia, and helps both Oman and the
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Figure 4 . 5 Oman
United States maintain a low profile to avoid criticism from
the more radical middle eastern states.
9 . Were There Any Significant Events Affecting the
Value of Access ?
The significant events are as follows:
1) Arab-Israeli War in June 1967,
2) Withdrawal of Great Britain from the East of Suez and
all Gulf Commitments in January 1968,
3) Military Assistance Agreement between South Yemen and
the Soviet Union in August 1968,
4) Formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries in 1970,
5) Syria signs a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union
in April 1972,
6) Arab-Israeli War in October 1973,
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7) Oil Crisis in 1973 that resulted in a three fold
increase in oil prices,
8) Fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979,
9) Oil Crisis in 1979 that resulted in another increase in
oil prices,
10) The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan in December 1979,
11) Iraq invades Iran in September 1980,
12) Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982,
13) United States agrees to re-flag and escort Kuwaiti oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf in October 1987,
14) Soviet Union set up a temporary office in Muscat in
October 1987,
15) Cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988.
These events carry some of the same ramifications for
the United States that they did for Saudi Arabia. The
difference is that Oman sought to build a low-key alliance
with the United States for insurance against Iran by allowing
U.S. Naval Forces to use Al Masirah Island as a staging point.
10 . Who is the Major Military and Related Services
Supplier to Adjacent Adversaries ?
There are two countries that possibly pose problems
for Oman in the future with regard to their regional and
internal security. They are Iran and South Yemen. Iran has
no particular arms supplier and the War with Iraq has severely
depleted their military stocks. Nonetheless, the ideological
differences and close proximity at the Strait of Hormuz make
Iran a major internal threat. Table 4.8 is a listing of the
military equipment of Iran.
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South Yemen has a full economic and military agreement
with the Soviet Union (Turnbull, pp. 110-121). Border clashes
are a common occurrence, but in September 1988, Oman and South
Yemen have met to settle the border issues. Regardless of
these meeting South Yemen will remain a primary regional
threat with a large contingent of Soviet military assistance
teams and Cubans soldiers.
TABLE 4 .
8
MAJOR ADVERSARY'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT
COUNTRY SYSTEM SUPPLIER
IRAN 11 RF-4E RECONN AIRCRAFT
FOR F-14 INCLUDING
USA
PHOENIX WEAPONS SYSTEM USA
186 AIM-9H MISSILES USA









130 CSA-1 SAM MISSILES
WITH LAUNCHERS
CHINA
Source: Equipment figures for Iran from SIPRI
pp. 249-266.
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C. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
1. Is the United States the Sole or Predominant
Supplier of Military Arms ?
The United States is not the predominant supplier of
military arms and related services for the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) . Britain is the predominant supplier of all
military arms and construction for the UAE. France and the
United States sporadically supply some military materials.
When compared to Britain, their contribution is negligible
(SIPRI, p. 268) . An example is, in March 1988 the UAE signed
an agreement with Britain for design and construction of a




What was the Total Dollar Amount of the 36b
Congressional Notifications During the Carter
and Reagan Administrations ?
There were no 36b Congressional Notifications for
proposed arms sales or transfers during the Carter administra-
tion. The total dollar amounts of proposed arms sales or
transfers for both Reagan administrations by fiscal year are
shown in Table 4.9.
3 Did the Dollar Amount of the 36b Congressional
Notification Increase or Decrease During the
Carter and Reagan Administrations?
There were no 36b Congressional Notifications for
proposed arms sales or transfers during the Carter Administra-
tion. Figure 3.6 contrasts the proposed arms sales or
transfers to the UAE compared to the amount of proposals to th
Persian Gulf by fiscal year.
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TABLE 4.9
TOTAL PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS FOR UAE
(in millions of Dollars)












GRAND TOTAL $ 889
Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.6 shows that the proposed sales of military
arms and services to UAE exhibits no graphic pattern. There
was an immediate increase of proposed sales in the first
Reagan Administration. The second Reagan Administration shows
a prompt decline. The increase in 1981 is attributed to
the arms proposal for seven Improved Hawk batteries with 34 3
Hawk Missiles for general self defense. The proposed sale in
1985 for $21 million was for follow-on equipment related to
the original I-Hawk sale in 1981.
4 . What are the Anticipated Payment Terms ?
The United Arab Emirates have not relied on the United
States Military Assistance Program or the Foreign Military
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Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.6 Proposed Arms Sales for United Arab
Emirates versus Persian Gulf
equipment or services. This is because of the ability to pay
due to large reserves of funds from oil receipts.
5. What is the Quantity of Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The quantity of United States proposed military arms
sales to the UAE for fiscal year 1981 was moderate at $828
million. The other two proposed sales, fiscal years 1985 and
1986, are considered negligible. Table 4.10 show the 36b
Congressional Notifications for the United Arab Emirates.
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TABLE 4.10
PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
(in millions of Dollars)
Administration Fiscal Year Amount Equipment














Reagan II 1985 $ 21 4 5 HAWK
MISSILES




Source Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings
October 01, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
6. What was the quality of the proposed arms transfer?
The proposed arms sales to the UAE in an absolute
context is considered low. The proposed sale of jeep-mounted
TOW launchers with 1085 Improved-TOW heart seeker missiles and
Improved-Hawk batteries with 388 Hawk missiles is similar to
equipment that can be purchased from a number of suppliers.
In a regional confrontation this type of military equipment is
excellent for self-defense. It would not be considered the
70
type of military hardware that could be used in an offensive
situation unless coupled with other more technical weaponry.




Is the Recipient a Major United States or
Western Oil Supplier?
The United Arab Emirates is made up of a loose
federation of seven independent or "Trucial States." The UAE
is centered around the wealthiest and largest, Abu Dhabi. Abu
Dhabi also has approximately 90% of the oil reserves of the
UAE. Dubai, the second largest has the remaining reserves.
As of 1982 the United Arab Emirates has an estimated oil
reserve of 32.4 billion barrels (Cordesman, p. 21). Japan is
the principle recipient of UAE oil, and in all likelihood will
continue this business arrangement. In fact, Japan has
reduced its dependence on Gulf oil, but continues to purchase
over half of the oil produced by the UAE (EIU, p. 9) . For
example, oil exports to Japan in the first nine months of 1987
totaled $3.8 billion (EIU, p. 9). Table 4.11 shows the top
oil recipients for the first quarter of 1988.
8 How Strategically Important is the Recipient's
Geographic Location?
The United Arab Emirates has 82,880 square kilometers
of territory. Its strategic importance lies in the amount of
oil reserves in the two largest Emirates and the two water
boundaries; one in the Gulf of Oman at the entrance of the
Strait of Hormuz and the other with approximately 300 hundred
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TABLE 4.11








The remaining 35.4% is held in reserve
Source: "Economist Intelligence Unit"
1st Quarter 1988, p. 2.
miles of coastline inside the Persian Gulf. Since its
founding in 1971 the Emirates have notoriously squabbled over
territorial rights, and normally do not cooperate with other
OPEC member in reducing production. The UAE is the most
unstable internally and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait help to keep
it stable. If it became anti-Western it would not necessarily
be a threat the United States strategic access to other Gulf
States.
9. Were There any Significant Events Affecting
the Value of Access ?
The significant events are a follows:
1) Discovery of large oil reserves in Abu Dhabi in 1959 and
in Dubai in 1966,
2) Withdrawal of Britain from all Gulf Commitments in
January 1968,
3) Formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries in 1970,
4) Oil Crisis in 1973 that resulted in a three fold in-
crease in oil prices,
5) Fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979,
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Figure 4.7 United Arab Emirates
6) Oil Crisis in 1979 that resulted in another increase in
oil prices,
7) Iraq invades Iran in September 1980, and the UAE an-
nounces its support for Iraq,
8) United States agrees to re-flag and escort Kuwaiti oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf in October 1987.
9) Cease-fire in the IRan-Iraq War in August 1988.
These events did not have the same affect on the rela-
tionship with the UAE and the United States that it did with
other Persian Gulf states. The UAE tries to maintain an
neutral posture on almost every issue due to the constant
pressure from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The ceasefire of
the Iran-Iraq War relieved some of that pressure, but the
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Emirates still have to deal with the Saudi stance to maintain
their position in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
10. Who is the Major Military Arms and Related
Services Supplier to Adjacent Adversaries ?
Most of the threat to the United Arab Emirates is
internal, that is, between the Emirates themselves. The only
outside adversary that could be a problem is Iran and they do
not have the financial backing needed nor a dedicated supplier
of arms. In the past Saudi Arabia had many confrontations
with the UAE over boundaries, but most of those have been
settled. Saudi Arabia still looks at the UAE to fall in line




Is the United States the Sole or Predominant
Supplier of Military Arms?
The United States is not the sole or predominant
supplier of military arms for Bahrain. Britain was the sole
supplier until their withdrawal from the Gulf in 1968. Since
then Bahrain has not depended on any one Western country for
military equipment, but has aligned with Saudi Arabia for
military protection. This is not to say that Bahrain does not
make independent buys. Since 1982, the United States, France
and West Germany have all sold military equipment to Bahrain.
2. What was the Total Dollar Amount of 36b Congres-
sional Notifications During the Carter and Reagan
Administrations?
There were no 36b Congressional Notifications during
the Carter Administration. The total dollar amounts of
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proposed arms sales or transfers during the two Reagan
Administrations by fiscal year are as shown in Table 4.12:
TABLE 4.12
TOTAL PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS FOR BAHRAIN






GRAND TOTAL $ 296
Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
3 . Did the Dollar Amount of the 36b Congressional
Notifications Increase or Decrease During
the Carter and Reagan Administrations ?
There were no 36b Congressional Notifications during
the Carter Administration. Figure 4.8 contrasts the proposed
arms sales or transfers to Bahrain compared to the amount of
proposals to the Persian Gulf by fiscal year during both of
the Reagan Administrations.
Figure 4.8 shows a marked increase in proposed arms
sales during the first Reagan Administration of $114 million.
In the second Reagan Administration there were more proposed
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Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.8 Proposed Arms Sales for Bahrain
versus Perisan Gulf
4 . What are the Anticipated Payment Terms ?
Bahrain has not relied on the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) or the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program
for any major expenditure of military equipment or services
from the United States. Bahrain has consistently paid cash
for all transactions involving military arms and services
(DSAA, pp. 24,60). In fact it has had no foreign debt at all
since 1985 (EIU, p. 2) . Bahrain lacks the large oil reserves
of the other Gulf States, but makes up the difference with
joint ventures with Saudi Arabia in marketing aluminum smelter
76
products, merchant banking, and a steady but low production of
their oil reserves. Bahrain's alignment with Saudi Arabia
promotes the desire for a "no political strings attached"
philosophy when buying military equipment. There is no reason
to believe that this policy will change.
5
.
What is the Quantity of Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The quantity of United States proposed military arms
and related services to Bahrain has been small to negligible.
Table 4.13 shows the dollar amount and type equipment of the
proposed sales during both Reagan Administrations.
TABLE 4.13
PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO BAHRAIN
(in millions of Dollars)
Administration Fiscal Year Amount Equipment




Reagan II 1985 $ 92 6 F-5E/F Aircraft
15 J-85 Engines
Reagan II 1986 $ 90 54 M60A3 Tanks
Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
6. What was the Quality of the Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The arms sales or transfer proposals to Bahrain in
absolute terms is low because of the age and sophistication of
the F-5 jet fighter. The fighter by itself is considered
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moderate, but the small number of this type of aircraft
coupled with a proposed purchase of only 60 AIM-9P Sidewinder
air-to-air missiles is unimpressive. In addition this
particular type of air offense and defense capability could be
purchased from any number of military arms suppliers. Because
of the size and location of Bahrain, the military forces are
small and are for defense only. In absolute and regional
terms their potential is low in both cases.
A related factor that might upgrade the regional
capability of Bahrain is their military alignment with Saudi
Arabia for protection (Cordesman, p. 583) . For example, the
proposed arms sale in 1982 of the F-5E jet aircraft was a part
of a package deal to give Bahrain the ability to take part in
a joint the air defense system with Saudi Arabia's AWACS buy
(Cordesman p. 584).
7 . Is the Recipient a Major United States or Western
Oil Supplier?
Bahrain has the least amount of known oil reserves in
all of the Gulf states. Seismic estimates in 1982 show
Bahrain's estimated probable oil reserves is .2 billion
barrels. Since Bahrain is an island state made up of 32
islands and therefore has limited territory, their oil
industry is fading. (Cordesman p. 21) . Because of this
natural depletion, Bahrain has limited their output of oil to
42,000 barrels per day (Cordesman, p. 583). This provides a
predictable income for budgeting. Table 4.14 shows the major
recipients of oil exported by Bahrain.
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TABLE 4.14
AVERAGE OF OIL EXPORTS BY BAHRAIN THROUGH 19 8 6








The remaining 32.4 percent is held in reserve.
Source: "Economist Intelligence Unit," Report
No. 4-1987, p. 2.
Table 4.14 shows that the United States is a small
recipient whereas the other Western countries are moderate
importers of Bahrain oil.
8 . How Strategically Important is the Recipient's
Geographic Location ?
Bahrain is an island nations consisting of one big
island and 32 smaller islands in the Persian Gulf off the
coast of Saudi Arabia. Because of the lack of independent oil
reserves and territorial limits Bahrain is unable to provide
for its own defense. It is tied economically and militarily
to Saudi Arabia and since the construction of the causeway
from the main island to Saudi Arabia, it is tied physically
(Figure 4.9).
For the United States Bahrain's strategic access is
critical to the standing Mid-East Task Force. Bahrain draws
some protection from its tenuous status as the informal "home
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Figure 4.9 Bahrain
port" for the five ships of the U.S, Mid-East Task Force
(Cordesman, p. 583). Following the withdrawal of Britain from
the Gulf in 1968, the United States was offered use of the
base facilities for a reported $4 million per year. The
agreement was publicly cancelled because of United States
support to Israel in the 1973 October War, but neither Bahrain
nor Saudi Arabia objects to U.S. naval ships conducting
business as usual. In addition the United States has not
cancelled nor altered the original payment. Bahrain is
considered high in strategic importance.
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9 . Were There any Significant Events Affecting the
Value of Access ?
The significant events are as follows:
1) Arab-Israeli War in June 1967,
2) Withdrawal of Great Britain from the East of Suez and
all Gulf Commitments in January 1968. The United States
agrees to rent the existing British facility for $4
million per year,
3) Formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries in 1970,
4) Arab-Israeli War in October 1973. Cancels agreement
with the United States of port facility for U.S. Mid-
East Task Force.
5) Oil Crisis in 1973 that resulted in a three fold
increase in oil prices,
6) Fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979,
7) Oil Crisis in 1979 that resulted in another increase in
oil prices,
8) The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan in December 1979,
9) Iraq invades Iran in September 1980,
10) Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982,
11) United States agrees to re-flag and escort Kuwaiti oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf in October 1987,
12) Cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988.
Bahrain will align with Saudi Arabia on almost any
economic of political issue. Therefore the effect of sig-
nificant events are the same.
10. Who is the Major Military Arms and Related
Services Supplier to Adjacent Adversaries ?
There is one country that possibly could pose a threat
for Bahrain in the future with regard to their internal
security and that is Iran. The threat is ideological rather
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than military. Bahrain's population is 60% Shiite Muslim with
the same basic religious beliefs as Iran. Table 4.15 is a
listing of the major weapon systems of Iran.
TABLE 4.15
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Source: Equipment figures for Iran from SIPRI
pp. 249-266.
E . KUWAIT
1. Is the United States the Sole or Predominant
Supplier of Military Arms?
The United States was not the sole or predominant
supplier of military arms to Kuwait until 1988. Kuwait's
annual military purchases from 1977 to 1988 averaged approxi-
mately $400 million. The majority of these purchases were
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from France (SIPRI, p. 255; Cordesman, pp. 570-571). Other
sporadic suppliers were the United States, Soviet Union and
Britain. In 1988, Kuwait proposed a major buy of $1.9 billion
with raised the United States to the predominant supplier
status.
2 . What was the Total Dollar Amount of the 36b
Congressional Notifications During the Carter
and Reagan Administrations ?
The total dollar amount of proposed arms sales and
transfers during the three administrations by fiscal are as
shown in Table 4.16.
TABLE 4.16
TOTAL PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS FOR KUWAIT
































Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
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3 . Did the Dollar Amount of the 36b Congressional
Notifications Increase or Decrease During the
Carter and Reagan Administrations ?
Figure 4.10 contrasts the proposed arms sales or
transfers to Kuwait compared to the amount of proposals to the
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Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.10 Proposed Arms Sales for Kuwait
versus Persian Gulf
Figure 4.10 shows a slight increase of proposed arms
sale during the Carter Administration. The first Reagan
Administration shows a small increase and the appearance of a
steady proposal each year. In 1988 an arms proposal for $1.9
84
billion for a state-of-the-art F/A-18C fighter aircraft with
associated weaponry was submitted. Compared to proposed sales
to Kuwait over the past ten years this substantial increase is




What are the Anticipated Payment Terms ?
Kuwait has not relied on the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) or the Foreign Military sales financing Program
for any major expenditure of military equipment or services
from the United States (DSAA, pp. 24,60). In fact, Kuwait was
the first Gulf state to realize the potential of having oil
incomes that vastly exceeded it immediate needs and therefore
is prepared to pay cash for all purchases including all major
military equipment and services (Cordesman, p. 569) . There is
no reason to believe that their cash policy will change.
5
.
What is the Quantity of Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The quantity of United States proposed military arms
to Kuwait during the Carter Administration was negligible.
The proposed arms sale in fiscal year of $57.6 million is
unknown, because the 36b Congressional Notification was
classified.
The quantity of proposed sales increased to small
during the first Reagan Administration and progressed further
to high in the second Reagan Administration. The reason for
the high category was the proposed sale of $1.9 billion in
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fiscal year 1988. Table 4.17 separates the individual 36b
Congressional Notifications by amount and equipment.
6 . What was the Quality of the Proposed Arms Transfer?
The arms sales or transfer proposals to Kuwait during
the Carter Administration in absolute terms is low and in
regional terms is considered moderate. The proposed sales
during the Carter Administration and the first Reagan Ad-
ministration consisted of the newer models of the Hawk Missile
and a missiles minder guidance radar with technical assistance
for two years. This type of air defense equipment can provide
an adequate defense against any of the regional adversaries,
but the capability of this military equipment would be
stretched to it technological limits in an absolute sense.
In the last year of the second Reagan Administration
a proposed transfer for state-of-the-art weaponry was sub-
mitted to the Senate. The proposal and subsequent approval
(in October 1988) of a sale and transfer of 40 F/A-18C Fighter
aircraft represents a transfer of the very best in quality
aircraft technology. Yet, the associated weaponry that is
included in the proposal is only moderate in quality. Both
types of air-to-air missiles that were offered are of 1960-
1970 's technology.
With 4 F/A-18C jet aircraft added to Kuwait's current
air force capability, it is formidable as a regional and
absolute air power. The other armed services have not fared
as well in their military equipment and cannot provide any
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TABLE 4.17
PROPOSED ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS TO KUWAIT
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Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
defense (Cordesman, p. 576) . Even if the rest of the Kuwaiti
armed forces had an equal amount of modern weaponry, the size
and location of the country makes it strategically vulnerable
to two of it neighbor, Iraq and Iran. Therefore as an
absolute and regional power Kuwait is considered moderate.
7
. Is the Recipient a Major United States or Western
Oil Supplier ?
Kuwait owns the second largest known oil reserves in
the world. A 1982 estimate shows Kuwait with 67.2 billion
barrels of reserve oil (Cordesman, p. 21). Table 4.18 show












The remaining 28% is held in reserve
Source: Adapted from Cordesman, The Gulf and the
Search for Strategic Stability . 1984, p. 543.
8 . Hov Strategically Important is the Recipient's
Geographic Location ?
Kuwait is wedged between the three largest and most
influential Gulf states. They are Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia
(Figure 4. 11)
.
Kuwait has five large refineries and loading facili-
ties on the Persian Gulf, and because of its small size, all
of these facilities are close together. Being so close to
Iraq and Iran, it is unclear that its oil facilities can be
militarily defended (Cordesman, p. 545)
.
Until 1987 the defense of Kuwait depended on a warning
from Saudi AWACS patrol aircraft. In 1987, the Kuwaiti
government asked the United States to re-flag 11 of its oil
tankers and provide escort and protection for them in the
Persian Gulf. This agreement has not been cancelled even
though there has been a cease fire in the Iran-Iraq War since
August 1988. With the proposed sale of the F/A-18C Fighter
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Figure 4.11 Kuwait
aircraft, it is postulated that the United States will
continue to provide protection to Kuwait.
Kuwait's strategic importance is based on the enormous
oil reserves and its close proximity to Iraq and Iran.
Therefore it is considered high in strategic importance to the
United States.
9 . Were There Any Significant Events Affecting the
Value of Access ?
The significant events are as follows:
1) Arab-Israeli War in June 1967,
2) Withdrawal of Great Britain from the East of Suez and
all Gulf Commitments in January 1968,
3) Formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries in 1970,
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4) Arab-Israeli War in October 1973,
5) Oil Crisis in 1973 that resulted in a three fold
increase in oil prices,
6) Fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979,
7) Oil Crisis in 1979 that resulted in another increase in
oil prices,
8) The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan in December 1979,
9) Iraq invades Iran in September 1980,
10) Iran launches air attacks to make Kuwait reduce its
support to Iraq in the War in 1981,
11) Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982,
12) United States agrees to re-flag and escort Kuwaiti oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf in October 1987,
13) Ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988.
Kuwait strongly supports the position (s) that are
espoused by Saudi Arabia. Kuwait's tenuous strategic position
and common political and economic philsophies, as well as
religious convictions, make for a harmonious partnership.
10. Who is the Major Military Arms and Related Services
Supplier to Adjacent Adversaries ?
There are two countries that possibly could pose a
threat for Kuwait in the future with regard to their regional
and internal security. They are Iran and Iraq. The Soviet
Union is the predominant supplier for Iraq. Iran does not
have any particular supplier. Table 4.19 us a listing of
major weapons systems of these two possible adversaries.
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TABLE 4.19
MAJOR ADVERSARY'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT
Country System Supplier
IRAN 11 RF-4E RECONN AIRCRAFT
FOR F-14 INCLUDING
USA
PHOENIX WEAPONS SYSTEM USA










130 CSA-1 SAM MISSILES
WITH LAUNCHERS
CHINA
IRAQ 70 F-7 FIGHTER (CHINESE
VERSION OF THE MIG-21) EGYPT
113 MIRAGE F-1C FRANCE
825 ROLAND MISSILES FRANCE
60 SA-8 SAM SYSTEMS USSR
38 ASTROL-II SS-30
ROCKET SYSTEMS BRAZIL
542 EXOCET MISSILES FRANCE
200 AS-30L MISSILES FRANCE
500 SA-6 GAINFUL SAM USSR/POLAND
360 SA-8 GECKO SAM USSR
200 SA-9 GASKIN SAM USSR
500 T-59 TANKS USSR
600 T-72 TANKS USSR
400 T-69 TANKS CHINA
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TABLE 4.19 (CONTINUED)
Source: Equipment figures for Iran and Iraq from
SIPRI, pp. 249-266.
F. IRAN
1. Is the United States the Sole or Predominant
Supplier of Military Arms ?
Prior to the fall of the Shah of Iran, on 16 January
1979, the United States was the sole supplier of military
equipment construction and related military services for Iran.
Since then Iran has been forced to depend on the international
arms market for military equipment to continue its war with
Iraq.
This intensive type of re-supply of military equipment
has had mixed results. First, Iran has paid very high prices
for a small amount of old and unsophisticated weaponry. These
military arms benefactors have been Israel, Italy, Greece,
Syria, Libya, North Vietnam, North Korea, and China. Some
believe the United States should be included on this list but
the involvement of covert arms shipments is still under
investigation. The most reliable sources show that all arms
transfer, including the United States, to Iran were limited in
size and sporadic in delivery (SIPRI, pp. 249-250; Cordesman,
p. 733). Secondly, and possibly the most devastating, is that
Iran has not been able to negotiate with a supplier that is
willing and able to supply them with all the military equip-
ment needed to continue the war with Iraq. Finally, unless
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Iran reaches some type of peaceful accord with Western
suppliers or the Soviet Union, they will not ever have the
military capability they achieved under the Shah's government.
2
.
What was the Total Dollar Amount of the 3 6b
Congressional Notifications During the Carter
and Reagan Administrations ?
There were no official 36b Congressional Notifications
during either Reagan Administrations. In the Carter Ad-
ministration there was only one year that any 3 6b Congres-
sional Notifications were submitted. This was during fiscal
year 1978 and was for $1,494 billion.
3 Did the Dollar Amount of the 36b Congressional
Notifications Increase or Decrease During the
Carter and Reagan Administrations ?
Figure 4.12 contrasts the last proposed arms sale to
Iran compared to the amount of proposals to the Persian Gulf
by fiscal year.
Since there were no 36b Notifications in fiscal year
1977, there was an increase in proposed arms sales for Iran
during the Carter Administration.
4 What Are the Anticipated Payment Terms ?
Iran used the Military Assistance Program (MAP) , the
Foreign Military Sales Financing Program and cash for major
expenditures on military equipment with the United States
(DSAA, pp. 24,60)
.
5 What is the Quantity of Proposed Arms Transfers ?
The quantity of United States proposed military arms
and related services to Iran until January 1979 was high.
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PROPOSED ARMS SALES




















Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 4.12 Proposed Arms Sales for Iran
versus Persian Gulf
Table 4.20 portrays the type of military eguipment and amount
of each proposed sale in fiscal year 1978. This was the first
and last year of 36b Congressional Notifications for Iran.
The quantity of proposed arms sales is coded as high.
6. What was the Quality of the Proposed Arms Transfers?
Until the fall of the Shah, Iran was rated high in
absolute and regional terms. The Shah's armed forces had
state-of-the-art military equipment. There is no question
that the United States supplied the Shah with enough military
equipment and training to have the largest and most effective
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TABLE 4.2
PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO IRAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 197 8
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$ 3 8.0 SPARE PARTS
FOR AH-1J
TOW HELO
$ 12 5.0 CONTRACT FOR
MISC SUPPLY
SUPPORT
$ 3 3.0 ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE









Source: Compiled by author from U.S. Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
military force in the Gulf (Cordesman, pp. 725-726) . The last
proposed arms sale in fiscal year 1978, Figure 4.20, shows
continued support for the technically superior military
equipment. With the break in diplomatic relations with the
Islamic Republic of Iran there have been no further 36b
Congressional Notifications since that time.
7 . Is the Recipient a Major United States or Western
Oil Supplier?
Iran owns the third largest known oil reserves in the
Persian Gulf. One source estimated that in 1982 Iran's total
reserve was 55.3 billion barrels (Cordesman, p. 21). Another
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respectable source gave an 1985 estimate of crude oil reserves
at 47.9 billion barrels (EIU, p. 31).
Exports of crude oil and refined products have been
severely curtailed by the Iran-Iraq War. As illustrated in
Table 4.21, there was a serious decline in exports in 1980 and
1981, with an increase in the follow-on years. Even though
the volume increased in 1982 and beyond, it does not reflect
the much lower prices for Iranian crude and the additional
insurance costs that the Iranian government had to bear in
order to trade. With crude oil and refined oil products being
the major revenue for Iran, this devastating reduction in both
price and amount exported has caused an overall deficit of
$938.5 billion at the end of 1984 (EIU, p. 39).
Table 4.21 represents the gross export of crude oil
and refined products through 1985.
TABLE 4.21
GROSS EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PRODUCTS











Source: "The Economist Intelligence Unit" 1987-88,















The United States has never purchased large amounts of
crude oil from Iran. In fact, the 11% of Iranian crude
received in 1978 was the largest percentage in any one year
(Berkowitz, p. 198). Table 4.22 shows an average of the the
top five oil recipients through 1983.
TABLE 4.2 2







Source: Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for
Strategic Stability , p. 11.
8. How Strategically Important is the Recipient's
Geographic Location ?
When the British government withdrew from their Middle
East commitments, the United States was forced to create and
maintain stronger regional allies to deter Soviet expansion.
In order to stabilize United States commercial as well as
military interests in the Persian Gulf and compete for
influence with Soviet Union, the U.S. came to rely more and
more on the Shah as a substitute for British power (Cordesman,
p. 804)
.
The fall of the Shah, in January 1979, exposed the
absence of United States power projection in the Persian Gulf
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area and turned a once powerful ally into a hostile and
potential threat, both politically and economically. In
addition, the vacuum gave the Soviet Union the signal that
they could expand into Afghanistan with no real interference
from the United States. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan
on December 27, 1979.
Figure 4.13 Iran
The United States has made significant inroads in
diplomacy and strategic access with all members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council. It has also been forced developed new
tactics to ensure that a force can rapidly deploy. Yet, the
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fact remains that Iran is still one of the most strategically
important Gulf States to deter the Soviet Union (Figure 4.13) .
Whether Iran is friendly to the United States or not,
their major role in the Persian Gulf is to provide a buffer to
keep the Soviet Union from expanding into the commercial oil
fields of the Persian Gulf.
9 . Were There Any Significant Events Affecting the
Value of Aaccess ?
The significant events that affected Iran are as
follows:
1) Arab-Israeli War in June 1967,
2) Withdrawal of Great Britain from the East of Suez and
all Gulf Commitments in January 1968,
3) Formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries in 1970,
4) Iraq signs a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union
in April 1972,
5) Arab-Israeli War in October 1973,
6) Oil Crisis in 1973 that resulted in a three fold
increase in oil prices,
7) Fall of the Shah on January 16, 1979,
8) Oil Crisis in 1979 that resulted in another increase in
oil prices,
9) The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan on December 27,
1979,
10) Iraq invades in September 1980,
11) Israeli invasions of Lebanon in June 1982,
12) United States agrees to re-flag and escort Kuwaiti oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf in October 1987,
13) A ceasefire is declared in the Iran-Iraq War in August
1988.
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10 . Who is the Major Military Arms and Related Services
Supplier to Adjacent Adversaries ?
There are two countries that are a threat to Iran's
regional and internal security. They are the Soviet Union and
Iraq. Iraq purchased the bulk of its military equipment from
the Soviet Union and France. Table 4.2 3 is an estimate of the
major weapons in Iraq's inventory.
TABLE 4.2 3
MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS OF IRAQ
Country System Supplier
IRAQ 70 F-7 FIGHTER (CHINESE
VERSION OF THE MIG-21) EGYPT
113 MIRAGE F-1C FRANCE
825 ROLAND MISSILES FRANCE
60 SA-8 SAM SYSTEMS USSR
38 ASTROL-II SS-30
ROCKET SYSTEMS BRAZIL
542 EXOCET MISSILES FRANCE
200 AS-30L MISSILES FRANCE
500 SA-6 GAINFUL SAM USSR/POLAND
360 SA-8 GECKO SAM USSR
200 SA-9 GASKIN SAM USSR
500 T-59 TANKS USSR
600 T-7 2 TANKS USSR
400 T-69 TANKS CHINA
Source: IEquipment figures for Iran and Iraq from
SIPRI, pp. 249-266
102
V. ARMS SALES AND THE U.S. ECONOMY
A. METHODOLOGY
A study conducted in 1976 by the Congressional Budget
Office looked at different savings opportunities to the
Department of Defense from a foreign military sales program
(Congressional Budget Office, May 24, 1976). Even though this
study was conducted over ten years ago, in the author's
opinion the positive aspects of the impact of a foreign
military sales program are still relevant. A second study was
conducted later to examine the impact of a restraint or total
ban of foreign military sales using a macro economic model
(Congressional Budget Office Working Paper, July 23, 1976).
The assumption made by the study was that if all existing
commitments were fulfilled, the impact would be minimal. It
is probable that this study is no longer valid because of the
changes over the last ten years (Bajusz and Louscher, p. 2).
In the author's view neither study adequately addressed
consequences or benefits of a foreign arms sales program or
ban on the military industrial complex. Also it did not
address the impact on employees of those companies with regard
to income loss or employment.
This chapter examines the impacts on the United States
economy from foreign military sales to Persian Gulf countries.
It is formatted as an application of the trend analysis model
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used by Bajusz and Louscher in their study of economic impacts
on military sales to the Middle East. Their model was chosen
because of the applicability of measurement devices and the
straight forward approach in determining a demand for military
equipment. Once the demand is determined, the model concludes
with a measurement of the possible losses in income and
employment opportunity. Their study uses the actual sales of
selected equipment as the baseline, whereas this study uses
the proposed arms sales or transfers from the Congressional
Notifications (AECA, Section 36b)
.
The results of the trend analysis will show a projected
annual demand of United States military equipment to the year
2000. Using the demand as a constant, the trend analysis
model is then applied to various income and employment
multipliers to show those projected annual losses to the year
2000. In addition, a tax multiplier is used to calculate the
projected loss in tax revenues for the United States
Government.
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT
1 . Are Foreign Military Arms Sales and Transfers
Important to the United States Economy ?
A report from the Committee on Foreign Relations to
the United States Senate over a decade ago remains the crux of
the debate on Foreign Military Sales and the economy.
The diversity of opinion about arms transfers makes it
impossible to devise a concise statement of the problem
that will satisfy everyone. Some feel that the problem
lies at the macro level—that arms sales worldwide are
consuming scarce human and economic resources. Others see
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the problem as a regionally-bound short-term phenomenon
that is already subsiding. ... Others feel that U.S. arms
exports are being driven by the competitive policies of the
other major suppliers and the superior quality of U.S.
defense products. (Congressional Report on Arms Transfer
Policy, p. 3)
This report precipitated a debate over two different
schools of thought concerning foreign military sales. The
first school questioned whether or not the United States
really needed a government sponsored foreign military sales
program. It contends that the derived economic benefits are
a short run gain and that a ban on foreign military sales by
the United States would promote worldwide arms control. Hence
the essence of their argument was that the United States
foreign military sales program should be banned.
The second school of thought points to two specific
benefits of a government sponsored foreign military sales
program. The first benefit was the real cost savings realized
by the United States Government when purchasing military
equipment. The second benefit was the increase in direct and
indirect income for the American work force, the availability
of work (measured in man-years) and an increase in tax revenue
for the treasury over the long run. Therefore, they contend
that it is necessary to the general health and welfare of the
United States economy to promote a large military industrial
base.
The first school of thought is based on a Congres-
sional Working paper in 1976 that studied the economic effects
of a ban on all foreign military sales. The study encompassed
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the effect on domestic employment, the gross national product,
price levels and other possible consequences of a ban on
foreign military sales.
The baseline date used for the study had a cutoff date
of October 01, 1977, and that all orders in 1976 would still
be filled. The study did not take into account commercial
sales, but concentrated strictly on government- to-government
sales. In 1976 commercial sales were considered insignificant
with only $.6 billion in sales per year. By fiscal year 1988,
direct commercial sales to foreign buyers had grown to $2
billion a year (Bajusz and Louscher, p. 51).
The results of the analysis stated that by fiscal year
1981 a ban on foreign military sales would reduce the Gross
National Product (GNP) by $20 billion. The study went on to
project that based on a $2,500 billion GNP, the reduction of
$20 billion for foreign military sales would only reduce the
GNP to about $2,480 billion. The associated projected price
level would be . 2 percent lower. The analysis also projected
an unemployment increase of only 0.3 percentage points or
approximately 350,000 jobs would be lost if the FMS program
were banned. Finally, the analysis resulted in a projected
decrease in net exports of approximately $7.5 billion (Con-
gressional Working Paper on the effect of foreign Military
Sales on the U.S. Economy, pp. 1-5).
The second school of thought, born at the same time,
was more positive toward for foreign military sales program.
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Proponents of this school prepared a defense by pointing out
the budgetary cost savings to the Department of Defense (DOD)
resulting from foreign military sales (Congressional Working
Paper on Budgetary Cost Savings to the Department of Defense,
pp. 3-5)
.
These savings were classified into five major cate-
gories :
a. Research and Development Recoupment
This is the first and most readily identifiable
saving from foreign military sales. Research and Development
(R&D) recoupment refers to the surcharge which is added to the
purchase price of a proposed arms sale or service to be sold
in a government-to-government agreement. In fact, the Arms
Export Control Act (Sections 21 and 22) commands the price
that all United States agencies and departments much charge
for arms sales and services to a foreign buyer. The "no-loss"
rule reguires that the price includes a charge for security
assistance program administration costs. This administrative
charge is made on all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and
Military Assistance Programs (MAP) and is approximately three
percent for standard eguipment and five percent for non-
standard eguipment. Above this assessment there is an
additional surcharge by the Defense Security Assistance Agency
(DSAA) for a portion of the R&D costs. These funds go to
service department that originally procured the eguipment.
The total surcharge for these administrative and R&D costs
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usually averages to nine percent above the real cost that the
Department of Defense (DOD) originally paid for the equipment
(Commitment to Freedom, p. 33). This surcharge represents an
expense that would have been sustained by the United States
and represents a cost savings. These savings percentages are




The second most identifiable potential cost
savings is related to overhead costs. Overhead costs are
normally classified into either fixed or variable catagories.
Fixed overhead costs do not normally fluctuate with the number
of items produced and are relatively insensitive to changes in
the volume of sales. Examples of fixed overhead costs are
rent, taxes, insurance and depreciation on manufacturing
facilities. Variable overhead costs are those which do vary
with the volume of sales. Examples of variable overheads
costs are light, heat and power and supervisory salaries used
in manufacturing facilities. It is normal for the contractor
to include these costs as part of the price of the item.
Since the fixed portion of overhead costs does not normally
fluctuate with volume of activity the more units produced, the
less each unit must bear as its proportional share of the
cost. If the foreign buyer is charged for a portion of those
fixed costs that would normally be charged to military
equipment purchased by DOD then a cost savings is realized.
108
The sale of military equipment and services to
foreign countries can generate a cost savings when they absorb
part of these cost that otherwise would be borne by DOD.
These savings are sometimes difficult to quantify. In order
to quantify significant overhead savings on foreign military
sales the assumption must be made that the absence of foreign
sales in the United States would not significantly change the
production base. The rationale for this is the argument that
the United States production base is sized to meet emergency
requirements and would not be reduced in peacetime in the
absence of foreign military sales (Congressional Working Paper
on Budgetary Cost Saving to DOD, p. 4). In addition, the
sharing of overhead cost savings can also be attributed to
commercial sales as well. If the foreign buyer is dealing
directly with a commercial manufacturer to purchase military
equipment that is being produced for DOD, then the commercial
sale could result in a lower cost per unit for the United
States Government.
c. Learning Curve Effects
Learning curve effects are those savings that
result from longer production runs. Factors that are respon-
sible for reducing the average cost per job are, familiariza-
tion by workmen, general improvement in total coordination and
development of more efficiently produced subassemblies. These
factors are well-documented in a RAND study of aircraft and
missile system. RAND concluded that in the absence of other
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factors the cumulative average cost of aircraft and missiles
decreases as the total number produced increases [RAND, June
1971] . If the sale of military equipment to a foreign country
promotes a longer production run, then the same military
equipment when purchased by DOD should be acquired for less
resulting in a cost savings.
d. Economies of Scale
This refers to the principle that asserts: When
the rate of production is expanded to full utilization of the
production facility, the manufacturer incurs lower average
costs. As in the above example of aircraft and missiles
systems, if the foreign sales promotes a lower average cost
per item, then DOD realizes a cost savings.
The only problem with the Principles of the
Learning Curve and Economies of Scale is that the cost savings
are extremely difficult to isolate and quantify in an environ-
ment other than strictly a military manufacturing business.
e. Production Line Gap
The last cost savings for DOD associated with
foreign military sales is concerned with the actual opening
and closing of the production line. If a sale of military
equipment to a foreign buyer facilitates a contractor keeping
a production line operating between consecutive DOD buys, DOD
can realize a significant cost savings by avoiding termina-
tion, set-up and tooling costs.
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These two opposing theories are equally persuasive
when viewed in the abstract. However, examining economic
projections using trend analysis and actual historic proposed
arms transfer data, may provide evidence on real world
consequences
.
2 . What is the Economic Impact of Restraint on
Prospective Military Sales to the Persian Gulf ?
Foreign military sales will have economic impacts on
the United States economy in a number of ways. The first
impact is on income whether direct or indirect. Direct income
is that amount that the contractor or sub-contractor receives
for producing the military equipment. This includes the in-
dividual product and the support services such as parts
support, training and in some cases future modifications.
Indirect income encompasses money that is spent by the
employees in the surrounding community. These are goods and
services such as housing, food, clothing. The second impact
is employment. This too can be either direct or indirect.
Direct employment applies to those hired to work for the
primary contractor and sub-contractors that were awarded the
foreign military sales contract. Indirect employment is
associated with those goods and services provided by the
surrounding community that expand with the size of the
contract. The third impact is the income taxes and other
taxes that are assessed on both companies and employees and
collected by the United States. Any contract that adds direct
income to the contractor will affect the tax base for that
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company. Indirect income is affected much the same way.
Taxes from the employee's earnings within the corporate
structure and from the businesses from the surrounding
community are two examples. (Bajusz and Louscher, pp. 51-53)
Before attempting to explain the economic impact of an
imposed restraint on prospective military sales, a basis for
the demand of military equipment must be developed using a
trend analysis. The trend analysis for demand is computed by
calculating the average dollar value of proposed arms sales or
transfers over the time period specified. This will establish
the average annual demand of arms sale to Persian Gulf
countries
.
The demand for military equipment and services
originates from the foreign country that wishes to obtain the
goods. In turn the Executive Branch must decide whether
equipment the prospective buyer wants is available, that the
equipment will further the political and ideological interests
of the United States, and how the prospective buyer will pay
for it. This decision process is culminated with the submis-
sion of a 36b Congressional Notification of intent to sell
military equipment or services by the Executive Branch. Since
Congress has never turned down a 36b Notification, all of the
proposed arms sales during fiscal years 1978 to 1988 are used
to form a baseline for the demand.
A trend analysis is used because it measures the
demand based on the assumption that past proposed arms sales
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will give an approximation of future sales of military
equipment (Bajusz and Louscher, pp. 71-95) .
For this study the demand for military equipment and
services is divided into three time periods. The first time
period, Table 5.1, is from fiscal year 1978 to 1981 when
proposed arms sales to selected Persian Gulf countries (Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait) were at their highest in terms of dollars.
When determining the economic impacts this table will provide
the highest demand or largest impact on income and employment
if arms sales or transfers are restrained in the future.
TABLE 5 .
1
AVERAGE PROPOSED ARMSSALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT
FISCAL YEARS 1978-1981
(in billions of Dollars)







AVERAGE YEARLY PROPOSED SALES
Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1988.
The second time period, Table 5.2, is from fiscal year
1982 to 1988 when proposed arms sales to the same selected
countries were at their lowest. In contrast with the previous

























income and employment if arms sales or transfers are re-
strained in the future.
TABLE 5.2
AVERAGE PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT
FISCAL YEARS 1982-1988
(in billions of Dollars)










AVERAGE YEARLY PROPOSED SALES
Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1,1978 to September 30, 1988.
The selected Persian Gulf countries used for the two
time periods are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This is because
they were the only Persian Gulf countries with enough propo-
sals over the two time periods to project high and low trends.
Proposed sales for the other Persian Gulf countries, Oman,
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, were too erratic to
include in these two time periods.
The third time frame, Table 5.3, depicts the average
trend of all five Persian Gulf countries in fiscal years 1978
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to 1988. This provides an overall average demand of military-
equipment based on proposed arms sales or transfer.
TABLE 5 .
3
AVERAGE [RP[PSED ARMS SALES TO PERSIAN GULF
FISCAL YEARS 1978-1988
(in billions of Dollars)
Fiscal Year Saudi Arab ia Kuwait Oman, Ba*irain, UAE
1978 $ 6.501 $ .058 $
1979 5.827 .107
1980 4.571 .024 .040
1981 15.326 .150 .890




1986 1.056 .70 .152
1987 1.085
1988 1.397 1.900
TOTALS $43,259 $ 2.566 $ 1 .312
GRAND TOTAL $47 .137
AVERAGE YEARLY PROPOSED SALES $ 4 .285
Source Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1988.
The results of the three trend analyses are compiled
and presented in Table 5.4. The table shows both the annual
demand of arms sales and services from the preceding tables
and a projection of that demand to the year 2 000. The
projection to the year 2000 provides an estimate of the total
market demand.
These results show an annual sales demand valued from
a low at $1.89 billion to a high at $8.14 billion. Projected
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TABLE 5.4
VALUE OF SALES DEMAND TO THE YEAR 2 00:
TREND ANALYSIS
(in billions of Dollars)
Projected
Category Annual Average Total Demand
HIGH
Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait (1978-1981) $ 8.141 $ 97.7
LOW
Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait (1982-1988) $ 1.89 $ 22.7
Persian Gulf
(1978-1988) $ 4.29 $ 51.6
Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1988.
to the year 2000, arms sales could increase from a low of
$22.7 billion to a high of $97.7 billion.
The rationale for using Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for a
high and low projection was the total amount of proposed sales
and the varied types of equipment in those proposals. The
amount of the proposed arms sales or transfers to these two
countries included military arms and related equipment,
support services and contracts, construction and training.
Even though Saudi Arabia has signed an extensive contract with
Britain for jet fighter aircraft, weaponry, supply support and
training, this does not reduce the amount of United States
military equipment that has been sold in previous years.
Previously sold U.S. military equipment will still need supply
support and training services. In addition the recent sale to
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Kuwait for F/A-18C fighter and support equipment will open new
supply contracts and construction in the future. Therefore
the results are feasible.
To test validity of the results obtained using
selected countries (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) an additional
trend analysis was conducted. The model was applied using
data for the five countries in the Persian Gulf over the
entire eleven year period. The results shown in Table 5.4
show an annual proposed demand of $4.29 billion which is
reasonable considering the high and low trends using the only
two selected countries. Similar results were obtained for the
projected total demand of proposed arms sales to the year
2000.
If the United States restrains or bans the foreign
military sales program, there will be impacts on both income
and employment. These impacts directly involve the manufac-
turing industry by decreasing their opportunity for income,
reducing employment for the surrounding community and thereby
reducing the tax base of the government.
One contemporary model used to analyze these impacts
on the economy was presented by Bajusz and Louscher in Arms
Sales and the U.S. Economy , 1988. The multipliers for their
model were based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) estimates and actual
sales data provided by DSAA. This study will employ their
basic model, but will substitute 36b Notification database
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compiled by the author to project loss of income and man-years
of employment. To ensure validity in forecasting these
economic impacts the results will be divided into three time
periods. The first time period will be from fiscal year 1978
to 1981 when the amount of proposed arms sales or transfers
were the highest. The second period will be from fiscal year
1982 to 1988 when the amount of proposed arms sales or
transfers were at their lowest. The third will combine the
five countries of the Persian Gulf over the entire time
period, 1978 to 1988 to test the validity of using the
selected countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for a high and
low results.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics recommends a multiplier
of 1.96 for estimating direct and indirect impacts on income.
Bahusz and Louscher conducted studies of various multipliers
to compare with the recommendation of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Table 5.5 is a summary of those findings. The
table is presented in this study to show the conservatism in
calculating the impacts of income by using a multiplier of
1.96.
To determine the direct and indirect employment loss
for an arms sales restraint, a multiplier of 1.75 was chosen.
DSAA data suggests this as a viable indicator associated with
overseas sales (Bajusz and Louscher, p. 102) . The model used





Researcher Year Model Used Industry Multiplier




Tiebout 1965 Economic Base Defense 2.436
Savage 1974 Input-Output Defense 2.00
Garnick 1970 Input-Output Military 2.26
Source: Compiled from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Department of Labor by Bajusz and Louscher, Arms
Sales and the U.S. Economy
, p. 104.
test the validity of the DSAA multiplier of 1.75. Table 5.6







































Source: Figures compiled from Bajusz and Louscher, Arms
Sales and the U.S. Economy , p. 103.
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Table 5.6 shows an average employment multiplier of
1.95 and an aerospace industry multiplier as 1.80 throughout
the major military industrial area of the United States. This
study will use the recommended multiplier of 1.75 because of
its conservativeness and the author's desire not to overstate
unemployment
.
In determining the employment generated by the foreign
military sales program, DSAA estimates that every $1 billion
of military sales will equate to 25,000 to 35,000 man-years of
direct employment and 18,750 to 26,250 man-years of indirect
employment (Bajusz and Louscher, p. 55) . A Bureau of Labor
Statistics study states that if a multiplier of 1.75 is used,
then a direct employment estimate of 35,000 man-years should
be used. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, January, 1982) In
the interest of conservativeness this study will use a direct
employment man-year figure of 25,000 and an indirect employ-
ment man-year figure of 18,750. Man-years were used in the
Bajusz and Louscher model because "the term man years of
employment rather that jobs... is a more analytically accurate
representation of reality." (Bajusz and Louscher, p. 60)
The results of this study, using the Bajusz and
Louscher model, are compiled and presented in Tables 5.7 and
5.8.
Table 5.7 shows an annual income loss of $3.7 billion
to $15.9 billion. Projecting this loss out to the year 2000,
the income losses could increase from $44.5 billion to $191.5
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billion. Table 5.8 shows an annual employment loss of 81,250
to 348,750 man-years. When projected out to the year 2000 the
employment losses expand from 976,250 to 4,201,250 man-years.
Country
TABLE 5.7
IMPACT ON INCOME WITH PERSIAN GULF
ARMS SALES RESTRAINT
(to the Year 2000)
TREND ANALYSIS










Sources: Format adapted from Bajus
Sales and the U.S. Economy , pp. 110-111.
Figures compiled by author from Senate















ind Louscher , Arms
To test the validity of the results obtained using
selected countries (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) an additional
trend analysis was conducted. The model was applied using
data for the five countries in the Persian Gulf over the
entire eleven year period. The results in Table 5.7 show an
annual income loss of $8.4 billion with a projected total
income loss of $100.8 billion to the year 2000. It also shows
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TABLE 5.8




Country Direct Indirect Total
Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait Annual 202,500 146,250 348,750
(High) Total 2,442,500 1,758,750 4,201,250
Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait Annual 47,500 33,750 81,250
(Low) Total 567,500 408,750 976,250
Persian Gulf Annual 107,500 76,875 184,375
(Average) Total 1,290,000 922,500 2,212,500
Sources: Format adapted from Bajusz and Louscher, Arms
Sales and the U.S. Economy ., pp. 110-111.
Figures compiled by author from Senate
Proceedings, October 1, 1978 to September 30,
1988.
an annual employment loss of 184,375 man years with a pro-
jected total employment loss of 2,212,500 man-years.
As previously discussed, with the loss of income, both
direct and indirect, there is a loss in the tax revenues
collected by the United States Government. For this study the
marginal tax multiplier in the Administration's fiscal year
1987 presentation to Congress of .25 is used. (Bajusz and
Louscher, p. 109) Using this multiplier there is a projected
annual loss in tax revenue of $0.93 billion to $3.98 billion.
Projected to the year 2000 this loss expands from $11.13
billion to $47.9 billion. To test the validity of this data,
the tax multiplier was compared to the five countries of the
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Persian Gulf. This analysis shows a projected loss in taxable




The foregoing case studies were conducted using the struc-
tured, focussed comparison approach using a set of standar-
dized, general guestions of each case. This- assures that the
data obtained from the various cases are comparable and are
relevant to the stated hypotheses. This portion of the thesis
is intended to contribute to the order, cumulative development
of knowledge and theory about formal 3 6b Congressional
Notifications and their implications in formulating an arms
transfer policy and strategic access. This section of the
study examines the four hypotheses:
HI) The Democratic Administration (fiscal years 1977-1980)
under President Carter obtained a reduction in United
States proposed arms transfers to the Persian Gulf
under the Arms Transfer Policy Directive of May 19,
1977.
H2) The Republican Administrations (fiscal years 1981-1988)
under President Reagan promoted an increase in United
States proposed arms transfers in the Persian Gulf
under the Arms Transfer Policy Directive of July 8,
1981.
H3) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are a major influence in
developing United States foreign policy in the Persian
Gulf and was the primary instrument used to gain stra-
tegic access.
H4) Foreign Military Sales will play a major role in




The results of the case studies are summarized in Tables
6.1 through 6.3. These tables are an overview of the effect
of proposed arms sales by the United States to the Persian
Gulf for fiscal years 1977 to 1988. Thus, Hypotheses 1, 2,
and 3 will be discussed by Presidential administration.
1. The Carter Administration 1977-1980
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The data table 6.1 and the trend depicted in Figure
6.1 supports Hypothesis 1.
DOLLARS




Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings
from October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.1 Proposed Arms Sales or Transfers to the
Persian Gulf by the Carter Administration
The Carter Administration proposed arms sales and
services to four Persian Gulf countries; Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Kuwait, and Iran.
Table 6.1 shows a decrease in arms proposals for Saudi
Arabia and Iran and Figure 6.1 graphically correlates this
decrease in arms proposals.
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Figure 6.2 shows that the proposed arms sales and
services for Saudi Arabia declined from a fiscal year 1978
high of $8.05 billion to $5.9 billion in 1979 to a low of $4.6
billion in 1980. The proposals for Saudi Arabia during the
Carter Administration were mixed between construction and
military hardware. The Carter Administration concentrated on
modernization of the Saudi armed forces. Referring back to
Table 4.2 will show that proposed sales for construction






















Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.2 Proposed Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf versus
Proposed Armed Sales and Services to Saudi
Arabia and Iran
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Figure 6.2 shows that the proposed arms sales and
services for Iran. It shows a substantial increase in fiscal
year 1978 of $1,494 billion but sharply declines to zero after
that. The Shah's government fell on January 16, 1979 and all
diplomatic ties were severed with the new Islamic government.
In the past, the United States placed great importance on the
strategic access to the Persian Gulf that Iran provided. With
this level of significance, it is postulated that the marked
decrease in arms proposals would not have been reduced to zero
if the diplomatic ties had not been cut.
Referring back to Table 6.1, and, as depicted by
Figure 6.3, there is an increase of proposed arms sales for
Oman and Kuwait.
Figure 6.3 shows the increase in proposed arms sales
for both Oman and Kuwait were negligible to small in quantity
and minuscule in amount. Oman had one proposal for $40
million in fiscal year 1980. Kuwait had three arms proposals;
$57.6 million in 1978, $107.3 million in 1979, and $24 million
in 1980. Compared to the total dollar amount proposed for
Saudi Arabia, their effect on strategic access is immaterial.
Table 6.1 supports and holds Hypothesis 3 to be true.
The fall of the Shah in 1979 created an abyss for
United States foreign policy and strategic access in the
Persian Gulf. The United States had been able to overcome the
temporary setbacks from other regional commitments that did










Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.3 Proposed Arms Sales to Oman and Kuwait
governments. Support of Israel in both Arab-Israeli Wars of
1967 and 1973 and the oil crisis of 1973 did not appear to
harm the United States access until the Islamic Revolution in
Iran.
By itself the Islamic Revolution did not cause a
change in status for the United States in the Persian Gulf.
There were several significant events that changed the
direction of the Carter Transfer Policy Directive of May 19,




First, the loss of an old ally such as Iran coupled
with the American hostage situation created doubt and criti-
cism of United States resolve to support friends in hostile
situations. Second, the situation exposed the absence of the
United States power projection in the Persian Gulf. This was
a clear signal to the Soviet Union that they could expand
their power base without fear of retaliation from the United
States. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27,
1979. Third, when Irag invaded Iran for control of the Shatt
al Arab, there was no cause for alarm, until Iran turned the
war around in their favor. This caused the predominantly
Sunni Muslim governments of the Persian Gulf to wonder just
how long it would be before the Shiite Islamic Revolution
spread to their countries.
On March 27, 1980, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
announced that President Carter was calling off the program to
trim foreign arms sales. He said that "while we remained
convinced" that international agreements to restrict interna-
tional arms sales "can contribute to a safer world we do not
plan to reduce further the ceiling on our own arms transfers"
(Senate Proceedings, April 29, 1980, p. 9364). Since most of
the foregoing events took place in the last 18 months of the
Carter Administration, the only thing he could do was rescind
the arms sales reduction of his 1977 directive and trade
military "arms sales or transfers for access" to regain what
was lost.
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The United States already had an agreement with the
Omani government for use of Al-Masirah Island. In 1980 the
administration submitted a 36b Notification for a proposed
sales of C-130H cargo aircraft (including supply support and
pilot training) and 250 Sidewinder missiles to arm their
British made Jaguar and Hunter jet fighters on credit. The
quality of the military equipment in the proposals was low,
but it provided for greater frequency of access to Al Masirah
instead of staging support from Diego Garcia which is over
2000 miles away.
Kuwait's geographic proximity to the Iran and Iraq
made the 36b Notifications in 1978 and 1979 for TOW and Hawk
Missiles a major contributor for strategic access. After Iraq
invaded Iran, another 36b Notification for a proposed sale of
armored personnel carriers, ambulances, command post carriers
and mortar carriers was clearly an attempt to ready Kuwait for
a ground war in case the fighting spilled over their borders.
2 . The Reagan Administration 1981-1984
Table 6.2 is a summation of the individual case
studies.
The data shown in Table 6.1 and the trend depicted in
Figure 6.4 supports Hypothesis 2.
The first Reagan Administration proposed arms sales
and services to five Persian Gulf countries; Saudi Arabia,
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Table 6.2 shows an increase in proposed arms sales for
all five countries. Since the proposed dollar amount for
Saudi Arabia is in billions of dollars, Figure 6.5 is used to
graphically correlates the increase in proposed arms sales for
Saudi Arabia compared to the entire Persian Gulf. The




Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.4 Proposed Arms Sales or Transfers to the
Persian Gulf in the First Reagan
Administration
Gulf countries is in millions of dollars and is depicted in
Figure 6.6.
Proposed arms sales and services for Saudi Arabia
increased dramatically in 1981 to $15.35 billion. The reason
for the large increase was proposal and subsequent sale of
eight Boeing 707 aircraft for $2.4 billion, five E-3A AWACS
aircraft, support equipment and contractor logistics for three
years for $5.4 billion and the highly debated 101 conformal
fuel tanks for the F-15 jet aircraft for $110 million. This
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Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.5 Proposed Arms Sales or Transfers to the
Persian Gulf versus Saudi Arabia in the
First Reagan Administration
package was worth $8.31 billion of the total proposals made in
1981. The remaining $7.44 billion of the 1981 proposed arms
sales were divided between $4.86 billion for construction and
$2.58 billion for military equipment. This is a ratio of two
to one in favor of construction over military equipment
proposals.
Following the huge increase in 1981, annual arms sales
proposals were substantially lower throughout the rest of the
first Reagan administration. After this one time drop in
annual proposals the increasing trend resumed. By fiscal year
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1984 the proposals had again increased to $3,224 billion.
Referring to Table 4.2 shows that modernization and construc-
tion of the Saudi armed forces was the major thrust of the
proposed sales and transfers.
Figure 6.6 shows the proposed arms sales or transfers
to Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait.







Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings,
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988
Figure 6.6 Proposed Arms Sales or Transfers to Oman
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait
in the First Reagan Administration
Each of these Persian Gulf countries had marked
increases but not of the magnitude of Saudi Arabia and cannot
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be graphically compared against total proposed sales of the
Persian Gulf.
Oman had one proposed arms sale of $62 million for
fiscal year 1981. It was an additional sale of three C-130H
logistic support aircraft. Yet, it was an increase of $22
million over the proposals in the Carter Administration.
The largest proposed arms sale outside Saudi Arabia
was to United Arab Emirates in fiscal year 1981 for $828
million. Broken down into the individual 36b Notifications,
$800 million was for the I-Hawk missile system and approxi-
mately 340 missiles, while the remaining $28 million was for
TOW launchers and missiles. This substantial increase in
proposed arms sales was to improve their self defense capabil-
ity and was the first made to the United Arab Emirates since
the AECA required the 36b Notification.
The proposed arms sales increase to Bahrain was for
$114 million. The equipment was for six F-5 jet aircraft with
only 60 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. This was the first
proposal made to Bahrain since the 36b Notification require-
ment had been effect and therefore was a definite increase.
The proposed arms sales or transfers to Kuwait during
the first Reagan Administration occurred in fiscal years 1981,
1982, and 1984. As with other Persian Gulf countries the
equipment was self defensive in nature consisting of I-Hawk
launchers and missiles, and TOW launchers and missiles. This
totaled to $407 million in the first Reagan Administration
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vice a total of $188.9 million in the Carter Administration.
This shows a definite increase.
Table 6.2 supports and holds Hypothesis 3 to be true.
The inroads made during the last eighteen months to
re-gain strategic access in the Persian Gulf were carried on
by the first Reagan Administration.
Beginning with the proposed sale of the AWACS early
warning system to Saudi Arabia, the Reagan Administration set
the tone for arms transfers as an integral part of United
States foreign policy. The issue was the topic of many
debates in Congress, but "arms for access" was the key to re-
gaining influence in the Persian Gulf. Couple this determina-
tion with increased power projection of sending a carrier
battle group inside the Persian Gulf and changing the Rules of
Engagement for these ships, and the message became loud and
clear. President Reagan intended for the United States
military forces and arms sales to Persian Gulf countries to
deter Soviet Union expansion plans for the Persian Gulf and
protect neutral shipping of oil to Western Europe and Japan.
The guantity and guality of all proposed arms sales or
transfers promoted self defense of those countries. In
addition it increased their regional and in some cases the
absolute military capabilities.
The key to strategic access in the first Reagan
Administration was the overt support of Saudi Arabia. Saudi
Arabia's position as the Guardian of Islam is without question
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the prime factor in any Persian Gulf policy that involves the
rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Even though their
actions are sometimes questioned by other Arab countries, the
majority of them will go along with Saudi Arabia's decisions.
3 . The Reagan Administration 1985-1988
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The second Reagan Administration continued the
proposed arms sales or transfers to the same five Persian Gulf
countries. Table 6.3 shows an increase of arms proposals for
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, and a decrease for Oman and
the United Arab Emirates.
Figure 6.7 correlates this increase in proposed arms
sales or transfers and holds Hypothesis 2 to be true.
Source: Compiled by author from Senate Proceedings
October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.7 Proposed Arms Sales or Transfers to the
Persian Gulf in the Second Reagan
Administration
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Figure 6.7 shows an immediate decrease in proposed
arms sales to the Persian Gulf between the first and second
Reagan Administrations.
This looks like an excessive decrease for the second
administration but it does not hold through the entire second
term. The slight increase from fiscal year 1985 to 1986 and
culminating with the dramatic increase in 1988 shows that
there was an increase in proposed arms sales or transfers.
Figure 6.8 shows that proposed arms sales or services
for Saudi Arabia decreased to $777 million in fiscal year 1985
but increased to $1,056 billion in fiscal year 1986 and has
made slight increases each fiscal year since.
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Source: Senate Proceedings, October 1, 1977
to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.8 Proposed Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf
versus Proposals to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
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Figure 6.8 shows that the proposed arms sales and
services for Kuwait declined to $70 million in fiscal year
1986, but sharply increased to $1.9 billion in 1988. This
increase was from a proposed arms sale of 40 F/A-18C Fighter
aircraft. This was not only a substantial increase in arms
proposals for Kuwait, but after it was approved, it made the
United States the predominant supplier of military equipment
and services for Kuwait.
Figure 6.9 shows increases and decrease of proposed
arms sales or transfers for Oman, the United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain in the second Reagan Administration.
Source: Senate Proceedings, October 1, 1977
to September 30, 1988.
Figure 6.9 Proposed Arms Sales for Oman, United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain, 1985-1988
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The proposals for these countries were not of the
magnitude of those made to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Therefore
they cannot be compared graphically to the total proposed arms
sales or transfers in the Persian Gulf. However, the trends
depicted in Figure 6.9 show that proposed sales decreased for
Oman and the United Arab Emirates and increased for Bahrain.
Proposals valued at $22 million for Oman were for
additional Sidewinder missiles needed to arm their British
made fighter aircraft. They continued to received an annual
cash payment from the United States for use of Al Masirah
Island. As in all proposed arms sales to Oman, 36b Notifica-
tions were made with a guaranteed loan written in the propo-
sal. The arms proposals for United Arab Emirates was almost
a mirror image. Primarily the proposal ask for an additional
4 5 hawk missiles to go with the proposed and subsequent sale
of I-Hawk launchers in 1981.
The proposed increase for Bahrain was for six F-5E jet
aircraft with 15 additional engines and 54 M60 tanks. This is
an increase from the past two administrations.
Table 6.3 supports and holds Hypothesis 3 to be true.
The second Reagan Administration simply followed up on
the previous four years work to maintain the strategic access
to the Persian Gulf. The concept of "arms for access" was
working very well and by 1987, had an established enough
creditability that Kuwait requested that 11 of their tankers
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be re-flagged and protected during transits through the
Persian Gulf.
Two events in 1988 prove that the use of "arms for
access" worked in the Persian Gulf. First, there was a
general cease-fire in Iran-Iraq War in August. The Islamic
Republic of Iran had fought Iraq to a stalemate and could have
possibly continued the war in the same fashion in which it had
been fighting. The hidden factor in this war was that the
entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had sided with Iraq and
the United States presence was felt each time there was a
confrontation with the U.S. Naval task force. The reason for
the GCC support was that the United States had provided enough
military equipment for these countries to defend themselves
against any Iranian attempt to spread the Islamic Revolution.
The dollar amount and type of modern equipment involved in
these many arms sales proposals from the three presidential
administrations, against Congressional scrutiny and debate,
sent a clear message to Iran that there was nothing to gain
from continuing the war.
Second, the Soviet Union began withdrawing their
combat troops from Afghanistan in August 1988. Although the
United States did not commit armed forces or a massive amount
of military equipment to the Afghanistan rebels, there was
support in the form of modern mobile weaponry provided to aid
them in their struggle. The success of this type of equipment
gave a lot of creditability to U.S. weapons that were being
143
proposed for sale to neighboring countries. The important
point was that the Soviet Union's expansion past their borders
was stopped.
B. ARMS SALES AND THE U.S. ECONOMY
The results of the independent and dependent variable
questions support Hypothesis 4.
The two government studies of 1976, discussed in the
independent variable question, were prepared at the beginning
of an increased Congressional awareness of arms sales or
transfers to third world countries. The first study was to
make the point that a severe decrease or ban on foreign arms
sales would have little or no impact on the United States
economy in the long run. . The second study was conducted to
point out the many cost savings that were realized as a result
of a foreign military sales program and how foreign military
sales were beneficial to the Department of Defense.
President Carter tried to reduce arms sales during his
administration. He called for stricter controls and a
worldwide reduction of arms sales or transfers to foreign
countries in his Arms Transfer Policy Directive in May 1977.
His plan was for the United States to be the role model for
the rest of the world by reducing United States arms sales by
8% per year for four years. The plan was overcome by world-
wide calamitous events. Both Congress and the Carter Ad-
ministration learned that a total ban or even a sharp
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curtailment of foreign military sales was not feasible during
the late 1970's.
President Reagan encouraged arms sales to allies and
friends as long as it promoted the interests of the United
States. Again Congress and the Reagan Administration learned
that during the first eight years of the 1980' s that a sharp
reduction in arms sales was not feasible.
Now that the Iran-Iraq War has subsided, the Soviet Union
is withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and as of November,
1988, an agreement has been reached to pull Cuban troops out
of Angola, the decade long debate concerning the Foreign
Military Arms program will have renewed interest. These
events prompted this study on the impact of a restraint on
arms sales or transfers to Persian Gulf.
The trend analysis methodology for this subject was first
used by Bajusz and Louscher in, Arms Sales and the U.S.
Economy , 1988. The model and analytical procedures used by
them was ideal for use in this thesis. Yet the format of
their analysis utilized data which was not totally compatible
with the author's goal of evaluating Foreign Military Sales
effect on the economy as described by this thesis. Their
study used available costs of selected combat aircraft and
equipment such as tanks, fast attack naval vessels and
selected aircraft weaponry in the Middle East. There was also
insufficient uniformity of the cost data across various
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equipment categories for the author's purpose (Bajusz and
Louscher, p. 130)
.
This study uses 36b Congressional Notification data.
Since Congress has yet to turn down an Executive Branch
request in the form of a 3 6b Notification, the use of the data
as a forecast tool is feasible. The proposed arms sales data
in the 36b Notification includes the price of the equipment,
the type and amount of military equipment that is being
proposed for sale, and to whom the equipment is going to.
Most importantly, it is not limited by selected combat
equipment. The 36b Congressional Notification includes all
types and grades military equipment, construction and design
services, training and supply support contracts.
The trend analysis in this study gave rise to two con-
clusions. First, in order to determine the economic impact of
a restraint in the Foreign Military Sales program, a demand
for military equipment and services must be established. The
results of the study projected a annual low demand of $1.89
billion and a annual high demand of $8.14 billion from Persian
Gulf countries.
Second an economic impact of the loss in United States
income and employment was projected from the anticipated
demand forecast by the model. When direct and indirect income
considerations are combined, the study reveals an annual loss
ranging from $3.7 billion to $15.9 billion from foreign
military sales to Persian Gulf countries. In turn, this loss
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in income equates to a direct and indirect employment annual
loss ranging from 81,250 man-years to 348,750 man-years.
The analysis presented thus far in this thesis are not the
only economic impacts that will be felt if there is a re-
straint in foreign military sales. In a national economic
sense, whenever there is a loss of income or employment, the
amount of tax revenue that can be collected for the United
States Government's use will also decline. Using a tax
multiplier of .25 this study estimates that a loss from $0.93
billion to a $3.98 billion is a possible.
This study points out some of the economic consequences
that could be expected whenever restraints are imposed in the
Foreign Military Sales program. These repercussions are
examined by specifically focusing on prospective United States
arms sales or transfers to the Persian Gulf.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A further useful analysis for strategic access would be to
take into account the military sales or transfers that are
below the monetary threshold established by the AECA. These
sales include commercial sales and those by the government
that fall below the established thresholds.
A further useful analysis for projecting the demand of
military sales would be to include the commercial sales that
do not fall within the threshold of the 36b Congressional
Notification. For example, the estimate for commercial sales
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in 1976 was $0.6 billion whereas the estimate in 1988 was $2.0
billion.
Studies of the economic impacts of lost income or employ-
ment opportunities could be researched in the individual state
and local community level. In particular where military
industry is the major employer.
Further study of the impact on the corporate and in-
dividual tax structure not only at the federal level but at
the state and local level as well.
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